The Economist - USA (2020-02-01)

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The EconomistFebruary 1st 2020 BriefingThe special relationship 19

2 spending over the previous five years. 
Those warnings helped trigger a spend-
ing boost, but three years later James Mat-
tis, then Mr Trump’s defence secretary,
fired another shot across the bow of his
British counterpart. “France and the us
have concluded that now is the time to sig-
nificantly increase our investment in de-
fence,” he warned in a letter, adding omi-
nously: “It is in the best interest of both our
nations for the ukto remain the us partner
of choice.” That prompted another hurried
injection of cash, but Britain has struggled
to keep up. The size of its armed forces has
fallen for nine consecutive years. Brexit
might lead to further reductions.
Still, American diplomatic and military
insiders tend to pooh-pooh the idea that
the relationship is in crisis, or that France
could supplant Britain. “The ukis still our
most capable partner militarily, and our
most valuable partner politically,” says Ra-
chel Ellehuus, who handled European and
natopolicy at the Pentagon until 2018.
However there are some signs of waver-
ing in Britain. On January 12th Ben Wallace,
Britain’s defence secretary, questioned
America’s reliability as a partner. Britain
was “very dependent” on American sur-
veillance and air cover, warned Mr Wallace.
“We need to diversify our assets,” he added.
British spending on American kit is already
slated to run to $32bn over the next decade,
around 7% of the defence budget each year.
But the options for diversification are
limited. Brexit has left Britain cut out of a
new European defence fund and a project
to build a European satellite-navigation
system. Going it alone is pricey: a proposed
British-built alternative constellation
would cost around £5bn. So Britain will
have a lot to wrestle with as it conducts a
comprehensive review of security, defence
and foreign policy. Mr Johnson has prom-
ised it will be the most radical assessment
since the end of the cold war.


But oh, if we call the whole thing off
The other test of the special relationship,
on trade, is likely to be similarly fraught; all
the more so given the rancour in Congress
over the Huawei decision. Tom Cotton, a
Republican on the us Senate’s Armed Ser-
vices Committee, tweeted that “I fear Lon-
don has freed itself from Brussels only to
cede sovereignty to Beijing.”
However, the desire for a deal is not in
doubt. Both sides are aiming for a compre-
hensive free-trade agreement, which could
dismantle non-tariff barriers. Negotiators
share an interest in strong intellectual-
property protection, recognition for each
other’s professional qualifications and
maintaining the free flow of data.
If Britain really wanted, it could proba-
bly get a deal in relatively short order.
America has a template trade deal that it
tries to push on all of its negotiating part-

ners. David Henig of the European Centre
for International Political Economy, a
think-tank, reckons Britain could sign up
to most of the text on tariff reductions and
services without a hitch. As a gesture, the
Americans could offer some special access
to their public-procurement market.
Indeed, American officials have been
helping to bring their British counterparts
up to speed, in some cases informing them
of stumbling-blocks in negotiations with
the eu. The warmth stems only partly from
a genuine wish to strengthen their rela-
tionship. It also reflects a desire to thumb
American noses at the eu—and pull Britain
away from its regulatory orbit.
In some crucial areas, Britain is going to
have to choose between the American sys-
tem of regulation and the European one.
Take the issue of food standards, often sim-
plified to a debate about chlorinated chick-
en. The eubans its import on the basis of
the precautionary principle, which says
that there must be scientific evidence prov-
ing something is safe for it to be allowed.
America flips that burden of proof; in order
for a product to be banned there must be
scientific evidence proving it is unsafe.
American negotiators scoff that the eu’s
approach is “unscientific”. Regardless, if
Britons opt for the American way, they may
quickly find themselves embroiled in the
eu’s non-tariff barriers for their own pro-
ducts. The euhas made it clear that any fu-
ture free-trade deal with Britain will have
to include provisions to prevent any “un-
fair competitive advantage” that Britain
could get by undercutting its environmen-
tal and regulatory measures. To put it an-
other way: if Britain wants to diverge from
the eu’s standards and follow an American
model instead, its market access to its big-
gest and closest neighbour will suffer.
If negotiators get bogged down, as they

probably will, then they could aim instead
for a quick and shallow deal, delivering po-
litical wins on both sides of the pond. Such
a deal could defuse the dispute over digital-
services taxes, or perhaps America’s com-
plaints over Britain’s subsidies for Airbus, a
European aircraft manufacturer.
Despite these potential hurdles, leaving
the eudoes not mean Britain has lost all its
leverage with the country Iran dubbed “the
Great Satan” to Britain’s “little Satan”. Brit-
ain can still draw on a depth of diplomatic
capital that offers it clout. It remains in the
g7 and the g20 and plays a big role in nato.
Britain has a wide network through the
Commonwealth and earns influence as a
major player in development aid. Not least,
it retains one of the five permanent seats
on the unSecurity Council. As the country
emerges from agonising over the Brexit ne-
gotiations, it can start to devote more ener-
gy to working out how to make the most of
these assets under its new, semi-connect-
ed status with the continent.
Indeed, whatever the intrinsic merits of
the Huawei decision—the British view was
that security risks could be managed and
that the alternative suppliers were not yet
up to scratch—it dispels the idea that a
weakened Britain leaving the euwill al-
ways bend to America’s will. When Britain
ingratiates itself with America, things do
not necessarily end well, as Mr Blair’s en-
thusiasm for the war in Iraq showed. A
clear-headed view of the country’s national
interests (which in the Huawei case in-
clude Britain’s wish for strong trade rela-
tions with China) serves it best.
Outside the constraints of the eu, Brit-
ain could have some scope to be more agile.
Take sanctions. It is true that Britain is los-
ing the ability to champion these through
the eu. But it also no longer has to be bound
by the need to thrash out lowest-common-
denominator agreement. It could, poten-
tially, take the initiative on its own.

Then that may break my heart
Some would like to see Britain take the lead
in areas where, for now, America seems to
have lost interest, such as championing de-
mocracy. (Though that would mean stand-
ing up to China.) Because Britain knows
America so well it has “a huge opportunity
to help countries trying to deal with
[it]...do it more nimbly and more strategi-
cally,” says Ms Schake of the aei.
Britain could remain in the bridge busi-
ness. The two countries may never regain
the first-name closeness shared by “Ron”
and Margaret or even George and Tony. But
a different American administration could
both rekindle something of that romance,
as well as help its ally remain closely con-
nected with the continent. For now, how-
ever, Mr Trump seems to favour a divide-
and-conquer approach. And that threatens
the ardour between Boris and Donald. 7
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