mistake was to overestimate Najibullah’s personal authority,
putting off until too late in the day the task of pressuring him to
go. Sometimes strong leaders are not all that they seem.
Was a workable UN plan derailed at the last minute by ambi-
tious commanders from the north? Some scholars have implied
that this was the case (Rais, 1994: 221; Kakar, 1995: 274; Ahady,
1995: 626), and an active conspiracy theory to this effect was to
flourish for years amongst emigré Pushtun extremists who resented
the rise of non-Pushtun leadership figures, but the evidence is not
in the least compelling. Massoud actually rejectedan offer from
Wakil to enter Kabul as head of state, and ultimately moved his
forces into the city only on 25 April when a takeover of Kabul by
Hekmatyar – in alliance with Khalqis and with support from
Pakistan – seemed imminent (Rubin, 1995b: 132–3; Bradsher,
1999: 381–2). Within the Mujahideen, it was Hekmatyar rather
than Massoud who was uncompromising: on 22 April, three days
beforeMassoud entered Kabul, Hekmatyar’s official spokesman,
Nawab Salim, was reported round the world as saying ‘Hekmatyar
can’t agree to anything that includes Ahmed Shah Massoud’
(International Herald Tribune, 22 April 1992). The UN plan was
fatally overwhelmed by the collapse of the regime, and Sevan
lacked the personal authority to rescue it: in the eyes of command-
ers (with whom Sevan had had far too little contact), he had been
too gentle with Najibullah, and for too long, to have any real cred-
ibility. Here, Rubin’s verdict merits repetition: ‘When state institu-
tions unravel, and armed factions emerge as the main form of
collective action, interim governments offer no quick solution to
the problem of political order. No government can compensate for
the dissolution of the state’ (Rubin, 1995c: 236). Unfortunately,
this curse applied not only to Najibullah, but also to his successors.
The Interregnum of Najibullah, 1989–1992 193