between two spheres of life: in my ordinary, everyday dealings with people,
I am entitled to show more concern for my friends than for strangers.
However, where I occupy an oYcial position, or have public duties, the
requirements of impartiality apply more strictly, and the legitimacy of parti-
ality is restricted—or even denied. Thus, it may be that I am entitled to save
my husband rather than a stranger if I am acting simply in a private capacity.
If, however, I am duty-captain of the lifeboat, it is much less clear that I can
simply, and without explanation, ‘‘opt’’ for my husband.
Considerations of impartiality can also be invoked in the opposite direction,
where they serve to remind us that, although our relationships with friends
and family are not governed by impartiality, impartial considerations do
nonetheless apply, albeit less strictly. Thus, although the relationship between
a husband and wife is (we must hope) governed by considerations of love
rather than considerations of impartial justice, the requirement to treat one’s
spouse as an autonomous individual, deserving of equal respect, still holds.
Impartiality allows that we may treat our friends more favorably than
strangers, but it does not license our treating them less favorably
than strangers. They may, in some contexts, be more than equal but they
should not be less than equal. These reXections serve to clarify the initial claim
that impartiality is grounded in a commitment to equality: while it permits
favored treatment for some over others, it draws limits to that favoritism, and
the limits are set, in part, by a distinction between private life and oYcial duty;
in part by the requirement to acknowledge that all are deserving of respect.
These considerations suggest that impartiality is centrally concerned with
the moral and legal rules of society, not with everyday actions by individuals.
The impartialist claim is that we should, collectively, adopt principles that
give equal consideration to all in the distribution of societal beneWts and
burdens. In order to avoid absurdity and to secure compliance, those prin-
ciples must be ones which allow discretion and acknowledge people’s natural
tendency to favor those who are close to them, but they must also draw limits
to the exercise of that natural tendency.
The question now is: How are those limits to be drawn? DiVerent writers
give diVerent responses to this question. Some urge that a form of utilitar-
ianism provides the best response; while others favor an appeal to what
people could reasonably agree to. Yet others argue that any sensible utilitarian
response will be extensionally equivalent to an appeal to reasonable agree-
ment. The next section discusses these diVerent interpretations and traces the
impartiality 427