On this reading, impartiality matters both because it reXects a commitment
to the equality of all, and because it supposes that people are motivated, not
merely by self-interest, but by impartiality itself. In other words, this under-
standing of impartiality makes a substantive moral claim (about the value of
equality) and a substantive claim about people’s motivation (they are not
motivated exclusively by self-interest but have, in addition, a motivation to
impartial morality). As Scanlon puts it, we see a positive value in living in
unity with others, and this suggests that we are (in some part) motivationally
impartialist: we have a felt need to act in ways that are defensible to others.
So far, impartiality has been considered as primarily a matter of the moral
and legal rules of society and it has been argued that, to be impartial, those rules
must be ones that take everyone into consideration in the distribution of
beneWts and burdens. However, in modern societies, especially multicultural
societies, two complications arise: theWrst is that there can be disagreement as to
what counts as a beneWt. Is it beneWcial to live in a society where extensive free
speech is permitted even when some will use that freedom in order to promul-
gate racist or sexist views? The second, and connected, complication is that the
commitment to equality which underpins impartialism is not a commitment
that all share. As Jean Hampton notes: ‘‘outside the West, social hierarchies and
restrictions of freedom are commonplace (and Western societies derided for
their commitments to liberty and equality); and even within Western democ-
racies, beliefs that would limit liberty (e.g. within certain forms of fundamen-
talist religions) or challenge equality (such as racist or sexist views) are far more
widespread than many would like to admit’’ (Hampton 1993 , 304 ).
The very general form of the problem here is that impartiality presents a
particular test for principles governing how we should live together. However,
not everyone accepts that this is the correct test and, since impartiality in
political contexts invokes the coercive power of the state in its support, the
question of what justiWes impartiality becomes pressing. Thomas Nagel puts
the matter this way:
Not everyone believes that political legitimacy depends on this condition [the
impartiality condition], and if we forcibly impose political institutions because
they meet it (and block the imposition of institutions that do not), why are we not
being just as partial to our own values as someone who imposes a state religion? It has
to be explained why this is a form of impartiality at all. (Nagel 1987 , 222 )
This quotation moves us on, therefore, to the challenge of showing that
impartiality is not, as Young claims, an ideology which promises, but never
delivers, equal consideration for all.
impartiality 431