importantly, charged that her conceptual distinction between recognition
and redistribution, or between culture and political economy, was too rigid. 5
In response to such concerns, Fraser has revised her approach in several
ways. First, if in Fraser’s initial essays the distinction between transformative
and aYrmative remedies was the linchpin of her argument, in her more
recent work that distinction has been displaced to the margins of her ap-
proach. Now, Fraser integrates recognition and redistribution diVerently: by
treating them as irreducible dimensions of a single, overarching idea of
justice, which is expressed in the norm of ‘‘parity of participation.’’ That
norm ‘‘requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of
society to interact with each other as peers,’’ and it has both ‘‘objective’’
conditions, involving the distribution of wealth and other resources, and
‘‘intersubjective’’ conditions, involving the institutionalized patterns of
value that assign (or fail to assign) people the status of peers (Fraser 2003 b,
36 ). Second, from the point of view of moral philosophy, Fraser now defends
this approach against rival accounts—particularly Honneth’s and Taylor’s—
on the grounds that it makes recognition a matter of the right rather than the
good, appealing to universal standards of justice rather than to controversial
visions of individual self-realization (Fraser 2003 b, 27 – 30 ). Third, Fraser also
connects this two-dimensional norm of participatory parity to the social-
theoretic position she calls ‘‘perspectival dualism,’’ which aims to account
‘‘both for the diVerentiation of class from status’’—that is, of objective
economic mechanisms from intersubjective orders of value—‘‘and for the
causal interactions between them’’ ( 2003 b, 48 ), thereby avoiding both eco-
nomic and cultural reductionism as well as the ‘‘night in which all cows are
grey’’ that she attributes to ‘‘post-structualist anti-dualism’’ ( 2003 b, 60 ).
Finally, Fraser now allows that there may be a third, distinct dimension of
justice and injustice, analytically separable from recognition and redistribu-
tion, which concerns the inclusion and exclusion of people from political
decision-making—for example, through the ‘‘framing’’ of what are actually
transnational political problems in national terms, which unduly conWnes
democratic participation within the boundaries of supposedly sovereign
states (Fraser 2003 b, 67 – 9 , 87 – 94 ).
5 For critical discussions of Fraser see Young ( 1997 ); Butler ( 1997 ); Phillips ( 1997 , 1999 , 2003 ); Smith
( 2001 ); Yar ( 2001 ); Honneth ( 2003 b); Zurn ( 2003 ); Baum ( 2004 ); Feldman ( 2004 ); for her response to
Young see Fraser ( 1997 c); to Butler, Fraser ( 1997 b); to Honneth, Fraser ( 2003 a).
458 patchen markell