superior opportunities, and therefore rewards, to those children who happen
to be less talented.
The minimal conception of equality of opportunity has been criticized by
many liberal egalitarians on the basis that the meritocratic system generated
by a commitment to equality of opportunities is widely perceived to be
compatible with, and indeed to generate, a society with huge disparities in
income and status in which a talented elite dominate while the disadvantaged
are deemed to have failed as a result of their own personal deWciencies. John
Rawls describes this approach to equality as an ‘‘equal chance to leave the less
fortunate behind in a personal quest for inXuence and social position’’ (Rawls
1972 , 108 ). In its place, he famously proposed a theory of justice which entails
a principle of equal basic liberties, and a second principle in which ‘‘social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are (a) to the greatest
beneWt of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to oYces and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’’ (Rawls 1972 , 302 ). In
this way the civil, political, and social citizenship rights mapped out by
Marshall are bifurcated, with civil and political rights being subject to a
criteria of formal equality, and social and economic citizenship being evalu-
ated according to two other criteria: equality of opportunity and the diVer-
ence principle (which states that social and economic inequality is just only
when it helps to improve the situation of the worst-oV).
Meanwhile, Ronald Dworkin articulates a radical form of equality of
opportunity by recommending that people start with ‘‘equal resources’’
(which may require the state to compensate some people for their ‘‘natural’’
disabilities and lack of talent), and are then allowed to pursue their ambitions
within the marketplace (with a laissez-faire state) (Dworkin 2002 , 87 ). The
distribution of resources must be allowed to be ambition-sensitive, but not
talent-sensitive—because talents are ‘‘traceable to genetic luck’’ and therefore
arbitrary with respect to social justice ( 2002 , 108 ). In other words, Dworkin
starts with a presumption of equality, asks what would justify inequality, and
suggests that while diVerential talent would not, diVerential ambition would.
2.2 Distributive Concerns
The brief survey of debates regarding equality of opportunity suggests that
there are signiWcant diVerences amongst liberal egalitarians. However, there
474 judith squires