although Nozick’s work on distributive justice is often memorably ingenious,
and did much to renew political theorists’ interest in property (Becker 1977 ;
Christman 1991 ; Reeve 1986 ; Ryan 1984 ; Waldron 1988 ; Sreenivasan 1995 ), it
also generated many persuasive critiques (Cohen 1995 ; Nagel 1975 ; Scanlon
1975 ; Ryan 1977 ;WolV 1991).
One reaction to Nozick’s counter-intuitive conclusions about even modest
redistribution is to object to their dogmatic reliance on under-argued as-
sumptions about the types of right a theory of distributive justice should
allocate. The charge is well-illustrated by Nozick’s infamous attempt to show
‘‘How Liberty Upsets Patterns’’ (Nozick 1974 , 160 – 4 ; Hume 1998 , 91 ).
The argument begins by inviting proponents of alternatives to the entitle-
ment approach to imagine that their favored distribution obtains; for ex-
ample, with everyone enjoying an equal share, or with shares distributed in
proportion to some personal attribute, such as deservingness. Now suppose
that Wilt Chamberlain is willing to display his prowess at basketball only if he
receives 25 cents from each of his spectators, and all 1 million spectators are
willing to make such an exchange. Granted these assumptions, NozickWrst
suggests we should accept that if the relevant exchanges voluntarily occur
then the subsequent distribution, D 2 , is no less just then the initial distribu-
tion, D 1. To do so, however, we have to abandon our commitment to
egalitarian or patterned principles since Wilt’s privileged position in D 2
violates those principles. Nozick then goes on to suggest his example also
shows that the distributions favored by egalitarian or patterned principles can
be maintained only by restricting the ability of individuals to dispose of their
holding as they seeWt, thereby implying that this renders them objectionable.
As many critics have noted, the force of Nozick’s example, and the plausi-
bility of his positive assessment ofD 2 and resistance to restricting transfers,
depends not merely on the assumption thatD 1 confers on individuals the
power to relinquish an extra quarter to see Wilt play. The example also
implicitly assumes that individuals have the power to bestow on Wilt a highly
unequal or disproportionate reward for his services, which Wilt himself may
then use in ways that have even further disruptive repercussions. Given their
eVects, however, it is far from obvious why any of us, not to mention
egalitarians and pattern theorists, should share Nozick’s assumption about
the extent of individuals’ powers.
Moreover, Nozick himself makes claims elsewhere that suggest he should
not take for granted the content of individuals’ ownership rights. Thus, he
disingenuously concedes that his Lockean proviso requires ‘‘a more complex
492 andrew williams