implementing those principles involves unjustiWably denying our decision-making
powers, or forcing us to share the costs of others’ decisions. Egalitarian principles
should, therefore, be rejected on the grounds that they unjustly limit liberty or
unfairly spread liability.
My previous remarks should indicate why equality of resources suggests a
relatively conciliatory response to this objection, which dispenses with the
outcome-based conception of egalitarianism the objection targets, allocates
various choices to individuals, and then holds them liable for their diVerent
responses.
Since the original presentation of equality of resources in 1981 , political
philosophers have followed Dworkin’s lead in defending other examples of
what I shall termpost-libertarian egalitarianism. They include rival resourcist
proposals, such as Eric Rakowski’sequality of fortune(Rakowski 1991 ) and
Philippe Van Parijs’sreal libertarianism(Van Parijs 1995 ), as well the left-
libertarian views already noted. In addition, there are welfarist alternatives,
such as Richard Arneson’sequality of opportunity for welfare(Arneson 1989 ),
along with hybrid proposals like G. A. Cohen’sequality of access to advantage
(Cohen 1989 ).
Several post-libertarians appear to have accepted that well-informed, vol-
untary choice against a background of equal opportunity can render any
unequal outcome just, even if some individuals fare extremely badly as a
result. For instance, in the example involving the risk of blindness mentioned
earlier, Dworkin writes that ‘‘if everyone had an equal risk of suVering some
catastrophe that would leave him or her handicapped, and everyone knew
roughly what the odds were and had ample opportunity to insure... then
handicaps would pose no special problem for equality of resources’’ (Dwor-
kin 2000 , 77 ). In the case of two individuals who face the same risk of
blindness, and the same insurance options, but who make diVerent purchas-
ing decisions, Dworkin then adds: ‘‘the bare idea of equality of resources,
apart from any paternalistic additions... would not argue for redistribution
from the person who had insured to the person who had not if, horribly, they
were both blinded in the same accident’’. Finally, he draws the stark conclu-
sion that ‘‘the situation cannot be diVerent if the person who decided not to
insure is the only one to be blinded’’ (Dworkin 2000 , 77 ). 4
4 Dworkin has more recently appealed not only to ‘‘the need to protect people from mistakes they
are very likely to regret’’ but also to the need to correct for imperfections in insurance markets in order
to show that, in practice, equality of resources would not condone extreme forms of voluntary
inequality (Dworkin 2002 , 114 ). His argument will not satisfy those who are convinced such inequal-
ities are objectionable in principle, and even in the absence of likely regret or ineYciency.liberty, equality, and property 499