8 The Trilemma
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One natural way to avoid the excesses of the post-libertarian view is to adopt
a mixed conception of justice concerned with absolute as well as relative
deprivation, which I shall termsuYcientarian egalitarianism. 6 On this view,
individuals have weighty claims against suVering certain forms of absolute
deprivation that cannot be relinquished through voluntary decisions, no
matter how favorable the background conditions. Thus, only some inequal-
ities can be justiWed by appealing to personal responsibility. Egalitarians who
adopt the mixed conception can endorse Marc Fleurbaey’s view of the
reckless motorcyclist who brings disaster upon himself, namely that ‘‘how-
ever criminal and stupid his behavior may have been, there is a limit to the
kind and amount of suVering he should endure’’ (Fleurbaey 1995 , 41 ). Simi-
larly, they can share Anderson’s conviction that ‘‘justice does not permit the
... abandonment of anyone, even the imprudent,’’ and that ‘‘starting gate
theories, or any other principles that allow law-abiding citizens to lose
access to adequate levels of... [certain] goods, are unacceptable’’ (Anderson
1999 , 298 , 314 ).
The suYcientarian view provides a less conciliatory response to the agency
objection than post-libertarianism, and challenges the objection’s fundamen-
tal moral assumptions rather than its portrayal of egalitarianism. More
speciWcally, the view rejects the objection’s refusal to limit liberty or to extend
liability in order to save some from absolute deprivation. It is important to
note, however, that there are at least two possible variants of this response.
Those variants diVer depending on whether they recommend limiting liberty
rather than extending liability. 7 Consequently, they also diVer in how they
treatexternalities, or the unintended eVect on others of individuals’ decisions.
One variant argues that limiting our liberty to relinquish certain claims
against others is justiWed when necessary to avoid absolute deprivation
without requiring some to bear the costs of others’ decisions. I shall refer to
this view asinternalizing suYcientarianismsince it aims to protect individuals
from bearing costs arising from others’ decisions. The other variant claims
6 See Casal (forthcoming) for a discussion of suYcientarian egalitarianism, and convincing
criticisms of the anti-egalitarian suYcientarian claim that when everyone has enough, there are no
reasons to distribute according to egalitarian or prioritarian principles.
7 For the insight that a principle allocating personal responsibility ‘‘presupposes an assignment of
rights to act... so as to provide a legitimate sphere of choice,’’ see Barry ( 1991 , 142 ).
liberty, equality, and property 501