where identity may or may not play a relevant role. I shall therefore start my
analysis focusing on the connection between ways of considering diVerences
and corresponding views of toleration. Four diVerent conceptions of toler-
ation will thus be singled out: (a) the view of tolerance as a moral virtue;
(b) and (c) the two liberal views of toleration, according to the perfectionist
and to the neutralist perspective in turn; (d) toleration as recognition. Only
the latter properly acknowledges diVerences as features of collective identity
and, hence, sees identity as an issue for toleration. Given that the most
divisive diVerences of contemporary pluralism have to do with collective
identities, theories of toleration that exclude identities from their proper
scope simply do not meet a main challenge of contemporary democracy.
According to a conception which has been very inXuential within contem-
porary moral and political philosophy, toleration (or tolerance in this case) is
explored as a moral virtue and is deWned as the disposition leading to
the suppression or at least suspension of the power of interference with
others’ disliked or disapproved behavior, which is considered important
both by the tolerator and by the tolerated (Mendus and Horton 1985 ; Mendus
and Edwards 1987 ; Mendus 1988 , 1989 , 1999 ; Horton and Nicholson 1992 ;
Horton 1993 , 1999 ; Heyd 1996 ; Galeotti 2001 ). In order for tolerance to be
deWned as a virtue, diVerences need to have the following features. They
should be bothdislikedandimportantfor the potential tolerator, otherwise
tolerance would not be clearly marked oVfrom indiVerence. It is then an open
question whether the proper diVerences to be tolerated are only moral or also
non-moral ones (Warnock 1987 ), and in the latter case, only elective or also
ascriptive (King 1976 ). I hold that if the moral model is to be consistent, the
ideal candidates for tolerance are diVerences that must, at least in principle,
be subject to choice. In order to be seen as a virtue, tolerance should be the
overcoming of one’s feeling of dislike or disapproval for higher moral reasons
such as respect for others and their autonomy. But obviously one’s negative
attitude should be backed by some reasons, otherwise dislike or disapproval
are unjustiWed in theWrst place, and respect for others instead of requiring
tolerance, requires one to stop disapproving altogether (Williams 1996 ).
Ascriptive diVerences, about which the person has no choice, cannot be the
subject of tolerance, given that it is morally wrong to disapprove of or dislike
them. Likewise, the disapproved diVerences must belong to the area of the
morally objectionable, but not universally condemned (Horton 1996 ). Atti-
tudes such as racism and practices such as slavery or torture, which are
universally acknowledged to be morally wrong and unjust, cannot be subjects
identity, difference, toleration 565