jurors, there are other obstacles that may impede juror
honesty during voir dire. There are several features of
voir dire that may serve as demand characteristics, or
aspects of the situation that communicate to jurors
what behavior is considered appropriate and accept-
able. For example, the situational aspects of voir dire
communicate to prospective jurors that the judge is in
a position of authority, and it is likely that the high sta-
tus of the judge makes the norm to obey authority
salient in this situation. The judge is dressed in a cer-
emonial black robe, seated at an elevated bench, and
addressed as “Your Honor,” highlighting his or her
elevated status and official role. Stanley Milgram’s
classic research on obedience to authority has demon-
strated the potential for this social norm to influence
behavior. In addition, several aspects of the voir dire
setting communicate the seriousness of the procedure.
The courtroom setting is formal and ritualistic. It is
likely that ideals such as fairness and impartiality are
made salient by the situational aspects of the voir dire
procedure. As jurors most likely agree with these
ideals, it may be difficult for biased jurors to admit
their biases in response to questioning by a judge.
The expectations that attorneys and judges have
about jurors’ level of preexisting bias may influence
the manner in which they question prospective jurors
and influence juror honesty. This is known as the
experimenter expectancy effect. Research in this
area suggests that when experimenters have a predic-
tion about the results of an experiment, this predic-
tion can be unconsciously communicated to
participants, which generates hypothesis-confirming
behavior from the participants. It is possible that
because judges must ignore their personal biases
when presiding over a case, they believe that jurors
also possess the ability to put aside preexisting prej-
udices for the trial. Thus, it is possible that if judges
expect that jurors will be impartial, this expectation
could be inadvertently communicated to jurors,
resulting in dishonest answers from the prospective
jurors in response to questioning.
As mentioned earlier, for voir dire questioning to be
effective in allowing for the elimination of biased
jurors from the venire panel, jurors must answer the
questions posed to them during voir dire honestly.However, during voir dire, the common legal practice
of juror rehabilitation may be an additional impedi-
ment to the honest reporting of juror bias during voir
dire. Indeed, when prospective jurors admit to harbor-
ing bias, the judge often asks if they can put their
biases aside and decide the case based on the evidence.
The Supreme Court ruling in Mu’min v. Virginia
(1991) simply requires an affirmative response to these
questions to demonstrate juror impartiality. Other
rehabilitation tactics include reminding the prospective
jurors of the grave importance of their civic duty and
that the law requires jurors to ignore all preexisting
biases and opinions. It is possible that prospective
jurors feel pressure to comply with a request from the
judge and are uncomfortable reporting that they would
be unable to be fair and impartial. It is likely that
prospective jurors find it difficult to respond honestly
to inquiries about bias.Caroline B. Crocker, F. Caitlin Sothmann,
and Margaret Bull KoveraSee alsoJury Selection; Scientific Jury SelectionFurther Readings
Batson v. Kentucky, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Jones, S. E. (1987). Judge- versus attorney-conducted voir
dire: An empirical investigation of juror candor. Law and
Human Behavior, 11,131–146.
Kovera, M. B., Dickinson, J. J., & Cutler, B. L. (2003). Voir
dire and jury selection. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.),
Handbook of psychology: Vol. 11. Forensic psychology
(pp. 161–175). New York: Wiley.
Marshall, L. L., & Smith, A. (1985). The effects of demand
characteristics, evaluation anxiety, and expectancy on
juror honesty during voir dire. Journal of Psychology,
120,205–217.
Mu’min v. Virginia,501 U.S. 415 (1991).
People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 339 (Cal. App. 2000).
State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio St.3d 120 (Ohio 1991).
Suggs, D., & Sales, B. D. (1981). Juror self-disclosure in the
voir dire: A social science analysis. Indiana Law Journal,
56,245–271.
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).858 ———Voir DireV-Cutler (Encyc)-45463.qxd 11/18/2007 12:44 PM Page 858