diVerences between a utilitarian account and an account based on the concept
of reasonable agreement.
2 Impartiality as Agreement
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
In ‘‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism,’’ T. M. Scanlon argues that the prin-
ciples to be adopted in a just society are those that could not reasonably be
rejected by people who are moved by a desire toWnd principles that others,
similarly motivated, could also accept (Scanlon 1982 : 200 ). Much has been
written about whether the concept of reasonableness invoked here can be
fully explicated, but I will not discuss that, as I wish to concentrate on
Scanlon’s appeal to those who are motivated to agree. In criticism of this
requirement, some have asked what is to be said about and to those who have
no such motivation, and Scanlon, in response, has recently revised his theory
so that it is grounded not in desire, but in reason. He now believes that even
those who do not, as a matter of fact, desire agreement have reason to seek
agreement with others. Whatever the truth on that point, Scanlon’s appeal to
agreement is instructive for an understanding of the justiWcation of imparti-
ality and for the speciWcation of why it matters.
To see this, we should turn from ‘‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’’ to
What We Owe to Each Other, where he claims that there is a positive value in
living with others on terms they could not reasonably reject, and he elabor-
ates this claim with the following example:
In the 1950 s many Americans believed, naively, that their institutions were uniquely
justiWable; that America was free of class barriers, and that it was a society in which
beneWts were fairly earned. They therefore felt that they could enjoy these beneWts in
the comforting conWdence that the institutions through which they had acquired
them, though not perfect, were closer than any others to being ones that no one
could reasonably object to. The combined blows of the civil rights movement and the
movement that arose in reaction to the war in Vietnam shattered those illusions
beyond repair. DiVerent people reacted to this in diVerent ways, some by protesting
against the war and working for civil rights, others by vehemently denying that the
charges of injustice at home and criminality abroad had any foundation. What these
reactions had in common was a deep sense of shock and loss; both testify, I believe, to
428 susan mendus