Famously (or notoriously) Rawls has argued that impartial principles of
justice may be the outcome of an ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ among people
with very diVerent comprehensive conceptions of the good. He concedes that
this is a ‘‘speculative’’ matter, but then goes on to note that ‘‘the history of
religion and philosophy shows that there are many reasonable ways in which
the wider realm of values can be understood so as to be either congruent with,
or supportive of, or else not in conXict with, the values appropriate to the
special domain of the political as speciWed by a political conception of justice’’
(Rawls 1993 , 140 ). The guiding thought here is that impartiality is not itself a
conception of the good, but a way of accommodating diVerent conceptions of
the good and, Rawls tells us optimistically, history suggests that it
will command support from people with a wide variety of comprehensive
conceptions.
Many have doubted the possibility of a Rawlsian overlapping consensus
and, in particular, have wondered what grounds his belief that there may be
convergence on impartial principles of justice, despite persistent divergence
about the best way to lead one’s life (see, for example, Hurd 1995 ; ScheZer
1994 ; Waldron 1999 ). Moreover, the objection is not merely a matter of setting
pessimism against Rawlsian optimism, for the supposition that there might
be convergence on principles of justice appears to amount to a denial of the
possibility of legitimatepoliticaldisagreements. Here again, the specter of
sectarianism stalks, and it is not clear that impartial justice can appropriately
be defended simply by assuming away the disagreements that divide people.
As Jeremy Waldron has noted: ‘‘pluralism of comprehensive religious, philo-
sophical, and moral doctrines is not the only pluralism with which we have to
deal in a modern democratic society. We also have to deal with justice-
pluralism and disagreement about rights. Maybe political philosophy should
be required to come to terms with that circumstance also’’ (Waldron 1999 ,
158 – 9 ). So, if we take impartiality to be, not a conception of the good itself,
but a way of attaining convergence between those who have competing
conceptions of the good, we are still left with questions about what grounds
there are for the faith that impartial principles will emerge from competing
conceptions of the good.
Nagel oVers an alternative way of responding to the request for a ‘‘higher
level’’ of impartiality when he appeals, not to consensus, but to ‘‘an inde-
pendentmoralargument that can be oVered to those holding widely diver-
gent views’’ (Nagel 1987 , 223 ; emphasis added). However, in a later work, he
goes on to acknowledge that the moral argument has limitations. He writes:
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