‘‘if someone is willing to commit his own life to a particular conception, and
convinced that the alternative is catastrophic, then it may be hard to resist
imposing his opinion on others who, understandably but erroneously, fail to
accept it... it may be diYcult to subordinate a concern for their good as he
sees it to a requirement of Kantian respect, if he is really convinced that
Kantian respect will allow them to doom themselves’’ (Nagel 1991 , 168 ). In
the end, then, and for Nagel, it is the moral idea of Kantian respect for others
that provides the ‘‘higher level’’ of impartiality. But, in the end, he must
concede that this moral idea may not be suYcient to justify forcing people to
do things against their will.
For both Rawls and Nagel the ‘‘higher level’’ of impartiality is elusive: what
is needed is a way of justifying the use of the coercive power of the state in
defense of impartial principles of justice, but the justiWcation must be one
that shows impartiality to be more than a contested conception of the good.
Nagel’s emphasis on impartiality as a moral value makes it vulnerable to
charges of closet sectarianism, while Rawls’s appeal to overlapping consensus
makes his account vulnerable to charges of politicalnaı ̈vete ́. However, the
very diYculties inherent in these attempts to discover the higher level of
impartiality themselves indicate exactly why impartiality matters. It matters
because we must, somehow,Wnd a way of living together despite our con-
Xicting beliefs about the right way to live. It also matters because, inWnding
that way, we must at least try to go beyond mere modus vivendi.
4 Conclusion
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
It is widely, if not universally, agreed that impartiality reXects a commitment to
equality. What is less easily agreed is what the scope of that commitment is and
how it is to be worked out. The previous sections have attempted to argue for
an interpretation of impartiality as primarily a requirement on the moral and
legal rules of society (not, or not primarily, a requirement on individuals in
their everyday actions). Additionally, they have attempted to show that im-
partiality is best made manifest through the concept of agreement. If we hope
that the moral and legal rules of our society will be impartial in the sense that
they will show equal concern for everyone, then we can best ensure that by
asking what the rules are that everyone could agree to.
434 susan mendus