various other features, which features may include the sheer possession of
skills and traits (Narveson 1995 ; Feldman 1995 ; McLeod 1999 ; Cupit 1996 ).
Indeed, a defender of this view holds that we may stretch the notion of desert
somewhat, and hold that deserving features may include even luckiness itself.
If ‘‘being blessed by good luck’’ were a feature that people admire and would
like to reward, then it could be said to ground desert as much as athletic
prowess, effort, and productivity do (Narveson 1995 ). Since this view is very
permissive about the things that can count as bases of desert, and suggests
that people have a claim to whatever rewards their positively appraised
characteristics can reap, it can be referred to as ‘‘the laissez-faire view.’’
To make sense of the laissez-faire view, it might help to see it as seizing on
one of the claims made by the conventional view itself—namely, that what
people deserve depends on what they dofor others—and taking it to its
extreme consequences. Others’ appraisal of what we do and are, and their
willingness to express that appraisal by giving us rewards, is all that is
required for us to deserve those rewards if we display the features that are
appraised. Effort, productive activities, and impressive performances are
among the things that are positively appraised, and that is why they ground
desert; but there are other things that are positively appraised. If faring well at
the blackjack table is one of them—if others admire the luck of the blackjack
winner—then the lucky one ‘‘deserves’’ to be better off than his unlucky
competitor, and any resulting inequality between them is deserved and just.
As Jan Narveson states:
Of the qualities in persons that interest people, some consist outright of capacities to
exert effort.... That’s a major part of it, certainly. But not all. Just as we admire the
sunset..., so weadmire human qualities even if they are not ones that can respond
to deliberate cultivation. (Narveson 1995 , 65 )
The laissez-faire view’s claim that no luck-neutralization is necessarily im-
plied by a commitment to desert is problematic, however. It might be thought
that the problem with this view lies in its misusing the concept of desert, since
that concept involves the ascription of responsibility to the deserving person.
As was pointed out earlier, many everyday judgments of desert seem to
suggest as much. However, there are many other everyday judgments that
do not support this claim, as it is perfectly intelligible to say that beauty
deserves praise, or that all human beings deserve respect. The problem with
the laissez-faire view is in fact better described not as misusing the concept of
desert, but as failing to give an account of why desert (as this view under-
stands that notion) should have any relevance for justice.
442 serena olsaretti