uncommon, and it is possible to conceive of desert as expressing the demands
of choice-sensitive justice (Arneson 1997 ; Vallentyne 2003 ). Indeed, some
have argued that desert is in general best understood as requiring as much
neutralization of luck as possible. Wojciech Sadurski, for example, observes
that the idea of desert is ‘‘to screen out all those factors that are ‘unearned’,
that are beyond human control, that are dictated by dumb luck, and for
which a person cannot claim any credit’’ (Sadurski 1985 , 134 ). As was sug-
gested earlier, we need not make this claim about desert in general, as there
are various conceptions of desert, including some that do not require luck
neutralization, and which, however, do seem to involve proper usage of the
concept of desert. But what we can say (and all we need to say) is that, in the
face of various conceptions of desert, some independent conviction about
what justice requires supports the adoption of one conception of desert over
others. One such conviction is that inequalities in desert are only justified
against a background in which people had a fair opportunity to be unequally
deserving; and choice-based desert is the conception of desert that reflects
this conviction.
So, the fair opportunity view of desert-based justice holds that, in order to
justifiably deserve more or less than others, people must have a fair oppor-
tunity to deserve more or less. Their choice-based deserts meet this fair
opportunity requirement. In order to realize desert-based justice so con-
ceived, unequal luck should be neutralized. Against a background in which
unequal luck is neutralized, if someone ends up worse off than someone
else as a result of a choice she made (including a choice to expend less effort),
she deserves to be worse off than someone else, so that it is permissible to
leave her worse off than that someone else. (Depending on other facts, it may
be required as well.) If, by contrast, she were worse off as a result of worse
luck, her being worse off reflects an unfair disadvantage, and she would not
deserve to be worse off. 5 This, then, is a view of desert-based justice on which
more luck than is suggested by the conventional view appears as unjust and
warrants redress.
By way of conclusion, we should address an objection that might be raised
against the fair opportunity view, which holds that adopting a choice-based
notion of desert leads to sabotaging desert. This, recall, is a point raised by the
5 She may also have a claim of justice, which must be heeded, to being better oVthan she is. But
note that even if we say this, it may not be true that shedeservesto be as well oVas the other person, or
that the other persondeservesto be worse oVthan she is. A demand of equality, rather than a demand
of desert, is what underpins both these claims.
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