(Mookherjee 2001 , 80 ). Enabling excluded groups to unsettle institutionally
accepted conceptions of equality will require parity of participation, which
makes democratic inclusion central to both the meaning and the realization
of equality.
InXuentially, Young argues that while there are pressing reasons for philo-
sophers in contemporary American society to attend to the issues of the
distribution of wealth and resources, ‘‘many public appeals to justice do not
concern primarily the distribution of material goods’’ ( 1990 , 19 ). They are also
concerned with stereotyping and negative cultural representations, and with
the justice of decision-making procedures. She suggests that while civil equal-
ity requires an end to ‘‘cultural imperialism,’’ political equality requires demo-
cratic decision-making. In order to pursue these wider goals of equality, one
needs to engage with and eradicateoppression, which ‘‘consists in systematic
institutional processes which inhibit people’s ability to play and communicate
with others or to express their feelings and perspectives on social life in context
where others can listen’’ (Young 1990 , 38 ), anddomination, which ‘‘consists in
institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating
in determining their actions’’ (Young 1990 , 38 ). So, whereas Taylor’s politics
of recognition focuses on oppression (as deWned above), Young’s politics of
diVerence aims to challenge both oppression and domination, focusing atten-
tion on democratic inclusion as well as cultural recognition. Accordingly,
Young proposes that mechanisms for the eVective representation of all citizens
should entail institutional andWnancial support for the self-organization of
oppressed groups, group generation of policy proposals, and group veto
power regarding speciWc policies that aVect a group directly (Young 2000 ,
141 – 1 ). These proposals have been echoed practically in international cam-
paigns to introduce candidate quotas for women, reserved seats for ethnic
minorities, and group representation on a wide array of governing bodies.
This marks a shift in focus, away from the substantive theorization of
equality and towards a consideration of procedural norms. Here, intriguingly,
the earlier equality/diVerence debate within gender theory, which led to the
development of mainstreaming as an equality strategy, could usefully be
drawn upon. However, procedural concerns cannot supplant substantive
concerns, for substantial economic equality may well be necessary for us to
be political equals. This demands that debates about equality be iterative
processes: for whilst fair procedures are needed to deWne what substantial
equality entails, some form of substantial equality may be required to secure
fair procedures.
484 judith squires