for negotiated outcomes. Contrast effects occur when
the options in an initial set are evaluated differently rel-
ative to each other when an additional option is added
that is similar, but inferior to one of the initial options,
making that initial option appear relatively more attrac-
tive. For example, a disputant involved in a dispute over
a piece of property might consider selling the property
and dividing the proceeds with the other party or allow-
ing the other party to keep the property in exchange for
a particular sum of money. When a third option is intro-
duced, for example, allowing the other party to keep the
property in exchange for the same sum of money, but
paid over time—an option that is similar but inferior to
the option involving a lump sum payment, more people
are inclined to choose the lump sum payment option and
fewer are inclined to sell the property and divide the pro-
ceeds than in the absence of the additional option.
Compromise effects, on the other hand, occur when
an extreme option is introduced into the set of options
under consideration. The introduction of an extreme
value alters the range of options that are in the middle
of the choice set. Because negotiators are more likely to
choose an option when it appears to be a moderate
choice, this shift in range tends to increase the attrac-
tiveness of a choice that would have appeared extreme
in the smaller set, but appears moderate in the presence
of the additional, more extreme, option. For example,
negotiators are more likely to enter into a land purchase
contract when the property at issue is considered
among a set of alternative properties that make it appear
to be a compromise, or moderate, option. Thus, while it
is useful for legal negotiators to actively generate cre-
ative options for agreement, it is also useful for them to
attend to the ways in which additional options affect
their evaluation of existing alternatives.
Finally, legal negotiators are also influenced by
how the negotiation is framed. Prospect theory sug-
gests that negotiators compare proposed outcomes
with the status quo. When the negotiator’s choices are
perceived as gains, the negotiator is likely to behave
in a manner that is risk averse—thus, civil plaintiffs in
ordinary litigation may be more inclined to settle. In
contrast, when the negotiator’s choices are per-
ceived as losses, the negotiator is likely to behave in a
risk-seeking manner—thus, typical civil defendants
may be more inclined to gamble on a trial.Social Factors
Negotiations in legal settings are also influenced by
a variety of social and interactional factors. Forexample, legal negotiation is influenced by the nego-
tiators’ perceptions of fairness. Negotiators are con-
cerned both with the distributive fairness of a
negotiated outcome and with the procedural and inter-
actional fairness of the negotiation process itself.
Importantly, negotiators resist agreeing to substantive
outcomes that do not comport with their notions of
substantive fairness. Similarly, fair interpersonal treat-
ment has been shown to diminish self-serving bias,
reduce the likelihood of impasse, and increase satis-
faction with substantive outcomes.
Social factors can also influence the perceived fair-
ness of a proposed settlement. For example, options
that are otherwise perceived to be fair seem less so
when proposed by the other side in the negotiation—a
phenomenon known as reactive devaluation. Similarly,
the negotiators on each side tend to value the conces-
sions that they make (and thus are perceived as losses)
more highly than they value those concessions that are
made by the other side (and thus are perceived as
gains). This “concession aversion” consequently influ-
ences perceptions of the relative fairness of reciprocal
concessions and of proposals offered by the parties.
In some instances, legal negotiators may also be
influenced by a need to restore or maintain a sense of
equity between the parties or to achieve vindica-
tion. Thus, they may reject compromises that seem
inequitable, even when accepting them would be eco-
nomically rational. Negotiators may also seek out
ways to achieve a sense of equity or the acknowledg-
ment of a harm. Thus, for example, apologies have
been shown to influence legal settlement decision
making. Research has shown that when a wrongdoer
apologizes (particularly if the apology accepts respon-
sibility for having caused harm), the injured party may
make more favorable attributions about the opposing
party and the incident, be less likely to seek legal
counsel for assistance in pursuing a claim, set lower
aspirations, find lower settlement values to be fair, be
less likely to desire punishment, and be more likely to
accept an offer of settlement than when the wrongdoer
does not apologize.Influence
Scholars of legal negotiation have also drawn on the
psychology of influence and persuasion to better
inform their understanding of negotiation strategies.
In particular, legal negotiators may adhere to princi-
ples of reciprocity when engaging in the back-and-
forth concession making that characterizes mostLegal Negotiation——— 449L-Cutler (Encyc)-45463.qxd 11/18/2007 12:43 PM Page 449