action, magical practices change the state of affairs inside a domain by
manipulating elements in another domain (for example, sunset is delayed by
placing a stone on a tree). Here the relation between elements is changed,
whereas their essential qualities remain the same. With the help of cognitive
blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), Sørensen explained how
people establish a link between two domains (spaces), relying on either part-
whole structures or conventional and perceptual likeness. Ilkka Pyysiäinen
(2004) argued that sympathetic magic (such as manipulating a voodoo doll to
affect a real person) is based on essentialist thinking: magical effects are
mediated by imperceptible essences. He also suggested that magic is about
effects in known reality, whereas in religion natural actions effect supernatural
reality. Thus magic and religion support each other: on the one hand, magic is
easier to falsify (its results are visible), and therefore it needs the support of
religious explanations; on the other hand, magic supports religion by offering
individual motivation.
Pascal Boyer and Pierre Liénard (2006; Liénard & Boyer, 2006) reframed
the cognitive study of rituals as a study ofritualization. The main character-
istics of (human) action ritualization are compulsion, rigidity (adherence to a
script), goal-demotion, and internal repetition (and redundancy). Boyer and
Liénard located the origins of ritualization in the so-calledhazard-precaution
system, a cognitive system that evolved to detect signs of potential threats and
set off precautionary behavior. The potential of such threats causes intrusive
thoughts and anxiety and motivates people to perform behaviors including
washing and cleansing, checking and rearranging their environment, and
vigilance. Boyer and Liénard used the hazard-precaution system to explain
both action ritualization and collective rituals. The system directly underlies
ritualized action, and the hyperactivation of the system results in the psychi-
atric illness called obsessive-compulsive behavior.
Before concluding this brief survey of cognitive theories of religion, let us
note that cognitive approaches to religion are often connected to the role of
religion in human evolution, either explicitly or implicitly. For example, the
hazard-precaution theory of ritual claims that people perform collective rituals
not because they are adaptive but because they engage a mental structure
(hazard-precaution system) that itself evolved as an adaptation in human
ancestors. In other words, people learn ritual behavior easily because they
have an evolved mental structure that is sensitive to clues about hazards and
hazard precaution. Thus collective rituals areby-productsof evolution. How-
ever, scholars who endorse theories of rituals as tools of increasing the
cohesion of human groups tend to agree that ritual (and religion in general)
should be understood as anadaptationin human evolution.
Beyond the adaptive value of religion, one can also ask whether cognitive
theories refute or confirm the truth of religious beliefs. In general, it can be
said that the Cognitive Science of Religion is neutral with regard to the truth
20 Cognitive Science and the New Testament