operations of the mind. The presence of something which is absolutely independent
and transcendent to the mind has to be accepted on account of it being impossible to
explain the fact of knowledge without such a position. We cannot regard the mind as
the ultimate cogniser of things, on account of itself being cognisable under certain
states of deep contemplation and meditation. The faculties of the mind, the vrittis or
the psychoses, can be observed analytically, and it is possible to change their modes
of movement by the application of a new power which is different from the power of
the mind.
But, there are certain quibbles in logistic philosophy which sometimes make out that
though the mind is not self-luminous and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an
ultimate subject, there is no need to assume the presence of a purusha or a
transcendent subject, as yoga makes out. The quibble points out that this is because
it is possible that this mind, which is assumed to be an object, may be cognised by
another subtler form of the mind itself. There may be another mind inside the
objective mind. And, why do we call it the purusha? It may be another subtler form
of itself, as sometimes it is said that the higher mind observes the lower mind, and so
on. This theory is refuted by the sutra, which tells us that the assumption of a mind
behind the mind may lead to infinite regress, because the acceptance of the doctrine
that the first mind is capable of being observed by a second mind may imply that the
second mind may have to be observed by a third mind, and the third by a fourth, and
so on, endlessly, which is an illogical position. This is called infinite regress—a fallacy
in argument, where we go on anavastha, or regressing ad infinitum, as they call it;
therefore, the sutra refutes this doctrine of the possibility of there being minds
behind minds, inasmuch as it may lead to chaos in the process of perception. Firstly,
there will be the confusion of anavastha. We go on counting minds behind minds
until we come to a tiresome endless process, which is not a conclusion at all.
Secondly, there will be confusion of memory. We cannot remember anything,
because which mind will remember what? As there are links behind links, the conflict
of the functions of the different minds may end in a chaotic mess so that there cannot
be memory of any kind of experience or perception.
This is the meaning made out by the sutra: cittāntaradṛśye buddhibuddheḥ atiprasaṅgaḥ
smṛtisaṅkaraḥ ca (IV.21). Atiprasanga is regress ad infinitum, and smriti sankara is a
confusion of memory. This is a kind of mere childish doctrine which is sometimes
advocated in certain aspects of logical argument. But this is not an argument. It is
only a kind of avoiding of the problem, and it is refuted vehemently by this sutra,
which makes out that this is impossible. In order that there is stability of perception
and fixity of knowledge, it has to be accepted that there is a permanent background
of consciousness which is independent of the fickle vrittis of the mind. The mind is
fickle; it is oscillating; it has got various movements in the vrittis. Therefore, if these
vrittis, which are undulatory in their character, are the ultimate stuff of which
knowledge is made, there would be uncertain perception and merely a movement
without a standing base behind this movement. As it is impossible to accept the
doctrine of minds behind minds, it follows that there is a purusha, a supreme
illuminating principle, whose fixity, eternity, infinity and stability is the cause of a
stable knowledge—a permanent cognisability of things, a certainty and an
indubitability in all forms of understanding. We have a certainty that we have a
knowledge of something. We do not merely oscillate from one function of the mind to
another function of the mind.