Such matters Jewel treated in his other works, especially in the
Apologia, and many of the arguments that Jewel employs in the Epistola
ad Scipionemand the View of a Seditious Bullcome largely from some
of the concerns already expressed in the Apologia. But where the
Apologiaaddressed affairs from the historical perspective of the early
Church (who was the innovator, who really had catholicity), these two
works treat their respective questions from their immediate historical
context. This is more the case for the View of a Seditious Bullthan for
thead Scipionem. In the latter Jewel’s argumentation often arises from
Patristic and ancient sources, since the questions concerning the
authority of councils can only make some reference to those earliest
ecumenical councils. Yet ultimately Jewel builds his case with arguments
drawn more from the Conciliarists. But whereas the Conciliarists faced
the perplexity of first two and then three popes, each of whom stood
tangentially as orthodox, for Jewel the question was rather why the
English should submit themselves to a council convened by such a one as
the Pope in the first place. Or perhaps more succinctly put, the Ad
Scipionemasks what sovereignty has the Pope over the universal Church
in general and the English Church in particular? In A View of a Seditious
Bull, Jewel treats Pius V’s writ of excommunication line by line; and
while the Ad Scipionemdeals with the Pope’s place in the Church, the
View of a Seditious Bulladdressed the question of papal prerogatives
over the civil affairs of kingdoms.
Jewel was not navigating new territory in his thoughts on councils, for
the other Reformers had followed this trail before. The Reformation
modus operandi,which slighted the new devotion on account of its
embracing the medieval sacramental system – à Kempis and Erasmus
remained dutiful sons of the Church – replayed itself in the procurement
of late medieval conciliar arguments respecting institutional reform.
Luther had briefly maintained a conciliar authority,^159 but for Luther
Conciliarism proved an ineffectual appeal; not simply because the
movement had failed to offer a real alternative to the abuses of the papal
monarchy, but because even by 1519 Luther had backed himself into a
corner on the question of Jan Hus and whether any of his propositions
condemned at the Council of Constance (1414–17) could be understood
in a Christian sense. Luther’s admission that Hus’s condemned faith
could have a Christian sense contradicted Constance, and thus
comprehended the notion that a general council could err. Therefore, as
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ELIZABETHAN CHURCH 97
(^159) Cambridge Modern HistoryVol. II, 78. Luther had drawn up an appeal to a future
general council, and had briefly in 1518 maintained the absolute authority of councils over
popes and all the Church.