poignantly about how this lack of self-regard is the distinguishing characteristic of a genuine
philosopher:
[T]he true philosopher, thoroughly oblivious of his own importance, and“totally discarding all
pretentiousness,”approaches his unfathomable object [namely, wisdom] unselfishly and with
an open mind. The contemplation of this object, in turn, transports the subject beyond mere
self-centered satisfaction and indeed releases him from the fixation on selfish needs, no matter
how“intellectual”or sublime.^41In Pieper’s view, wherever selfishness dominates the existential arena,“there we should not expect
true philosophy to flourish, if it can come about at all.”^42
Conclusion
Philosophy, when it is understood properly and in a manner akin to Socrates’“the art of dying,”is
at the core of any true liberal education, where“liberal”means“to be free, especially to be free of
oneself, to be free of those passions and habits within us that might deflect us from grasping what
is there.”^43 As the most liberating of all the arts, philosophy must also entail the freedom to pursue
the highest objects of existence. But this necessarily means that all lower aims and all lower
sights, i.e., all those aims or ends not commensurate with knowing“reality as such”or with
“absolute freedom”(moksa), must be put aside. Time and time again, contemplatives therefore
warn against engaging in wisdom’s pursuit for money,^44 or in meditative and contemplative
practices for the various powers that one might acquire.^45 Philosophy cannot be put to work in the
service of worldly attainments and ambitionswithout bringing about its own destruction, or
without turning into sophistry.
The sophist Protagoras once proclaimed that the purpose of pursuing wisdom–something he
claimed for himself–is to teach others how to deal successfully with the world; in his view, it is
the business of the wise to teach others how to take proper care of their personal affairs.^46 In this
regard, Protagoras’attitude toward wisdom’s pursuit coincides with the views of most modern-
day education reformers. However, as Pieper remarks, philosophic inquiry into“the totality of
things”cannot properly be made commensurate with the world of work and its finite aims:
“Whoever seeks to eliminate the fundamental incommensurability between philosophy and the
world of work only serves to make the philosophical act improbable of achievement or even
impossible.”^47
We can now see clearly the wrong-headedness of so much that is being undertaken in the name
of philosophy in schools today. For instance, one cannot properly engage in philosophizing as a
means to improve critical thinking, to enhance academic performance, or to boost test scores.
Indeed, where Winstanley demands that philosophy be“presented as a useful and relevant
subject”that offers children“benefits”which may be demonstrated by“fair empirical assessment,”^48
it would seem to me to be most dangerous for philosophy that it be associated with any grades at
all: not only do grades serve as rewards and punishments that very often deflect students–
particularly the keen, ambitious, and competitive ones–from learning what they are learning for
its own sake. Aquinas writes about the“circular movement”of the soul that is engaged in
contemplation,“there is no error,”just as there is no error in the knowledge of first principles
which we know by simple intuition (simplici intuiti)^49 ; and certainly, without the possibility of
error, how could grades make any sense at all? Consequently, in a true wisdom-seeking
environment, students and teachers must be liberated from the widespread and all-consuming
concern with grades and the assessment of student work to make“space”for the possibility
of philosophy.
120 Sean Steel