others (who may or may not claim to be wise) conceptualize and interpret political concepts,
including justice, equality, and freedom. Once again, the analytic theorist is not interested in
bringing to light any definitive or comprehensive definition. Rather his or her aim is simply to
examine how the use of these concepts not only informs our perceptions of social reality, but can
also expand or limit our moral sensibilities. This is because“concern with language must be an
ultimate concern,”Gunnell writes,“since it is through language that a world is gained”^24 ;or,
as Orwell reminds us, is lost.
Implicit in the works of those thinkers who adopt an analytical approach is a human predicament
that can be traced back to careless ways of thinking and speaking about human nature, the good life,
freedom, and civil society. Ours is an intellectual and conceptual predicament largely inherited
from theorists and philosophers who, throughout the ages, have mistakenly presupposed that
political truths and social values can be traced to a natural law or“a science of man,”which,
coincidentally, is an extension of human reason. Political theorists–classical, modern, and even
contemporary, according to the analytical critic, have been besotted with the notion of a tran-
scendent morality, and, thus, overly preoccupied with placing“a template of universalistic
rationality (and morality) over the world, which it has to measure up to.”^25
For the analytical thinker the perennial, albeit misguided, search for the essence of human nature,
and fundamental truth(s) about social reality not only poses philosophical problems when we think
about norms in this way, but raises a practical problem in contemporary political thought too;
namely, how can one provide a case for justice and democratic values without drawing upon natural
law theory or other metaphysical abstractions? In their search for standards, some analytical
thinkers have turned to the writings of Wittgenstein for insight into“how language relates to social
plurality and difference”^26 with the expectation that critical language analysis grafted onto political
theorycanliberate human beings from their cravingfor definitive meanings and will make way for a
new intellectually robust theory of democracy.
Still other analytic theorists remain agnostic, content with pursuing critical thinking as a good for
its own sake. Our (analytical) task, Oakeshott proclaimed,“consists, not in persuading others, but in
making our own minds clear.”^27 These analytical thinkers–distant heirs of Socrates, aim to per-
suade others of the weaknesses in their arguments–including other analytical thinkers. In fact, it is
these critical critics who object to privileging the writings of any thinker to support a preconceived
notion of political theory. Admittedly critical inquiry can conceivably be used (e.g., Wittgenstein)
to prevent language from going on holiday, and may even provide theory of justice and criteria for
democracy. Nonetheless, the analytical thinker aims to prevent political theorizing from lapsing
into a tendency to draw hasty conclusions–a perennial weakness of the justice-seeking and
knowledge-seeking approaches.“There are,”Gunnell acknowledges,“various insights that may be
derived from Wittgenstein, as well as any number of philosophers, about both the substance and
form of political theory, but this does not absolve political theory of the‘trouble of thinking.’”^28
Pascal best summed up the“credo”of those, like Gunnell, who adopt an analytical approach to
political theory:“Thought makes the whole dignity of man; therefore endeavor to think well, thatis
the only morality.”^29 Implicit in this enterprise are clearly values that, apparently, the analytical
thinker can no more run away from than can the rest of us.
Political Theory and the Socratic Approach
All of these approaches–justice-seeking, knowledge-seeking, and analytical inquiry–are
themselves analytical categories. By isolating each approach, the student is better able to under-
stand what is important to political theorists and why they think it important. They can also see and
appreciate how these approaches can work in tandem. Students can become aware of how easily
theorists move between different kinds of questions, often in ways they (and their readers) may or
may not be aware of, and the effect these changes have on his or her argument. For example, the
The Socratic Method’s Search for Standards 159