Unlike shame, moderation exists by nature and takes the form of an idea (eide).^53 For a philo-
sophically inclined statesman, it would surely be an exercise in moderation to permit the non-
philosophers to retain their emotional attachments to whatever form or variety ofaidosserved
public order, perhaps merely the reverential attitude to the past that today is associated with
patriotism.
What, then, of holiness and piety? It is clear from both theEuthyphroand the cross-examination
of Meletus that the Athenians have no knowledge of these things. But neither, it would seem, does
Socrates. Francesco Gonzales has argued that Socrates deals with their problem by showing“he
cares about piety and goodness”and that such care paradoxically“constitutes whatever piety and
goodness humans are capable of.”^54 Or, there is the problem of the Oracle story, which Socrates can
neither accept at face value nor challenge directly, though questioning the Oracle is an indication of
his care for piety. Examined piety, however, entails another paradox:
Socrates disbelieves the oracle because he is aware of his own ignorance, but it is only through
being aware of his own ignorance that he obeys the oracle. Furthermore, it is only through
questioning what the god says that Socrates’life becomes a service to the god.^55Such dramatic, even existential reading of Socrates’Mission indicates that his“questioning is
inconceivable without humility before, and the constant aspiration to, the divine. If it was con-
cluded above that questioning is essential to Socratic piety, it must be concluded here that piety is
essential to Socratic questioning.”^56 Likewise human virtue and goodness consist of caring for
one’s goodness and virtue, which involves continual examination and discussion of goodness and
virtue and not the possession of either. In this light, neither the Athenians nor Meletus care about
those things, and that is their error and their fault. Socrates’discussion of this problem with them is
necessarily ironical because philosophy is ironical. It is a way of life that is good and just but never
possesses goodness or justice; it is a happy way of life that never attains satisfaction. Such ambi-
valence expressed as irony and, indeed, as comedy, is essential to Socratic existence.^57
Notes
1 See Leonardo Taran,Speusippus of Athens: A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and
Commentary(Leiden: Brill, 1982) and John Dillon, The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2003).
2 For similar distinctions see: Gerald A. Press,“Introduction”toPlato’s Dialogues: New Studies and
Interpretations, Gerald A. Press, ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 7; Rosamund Kent
Sprague,“Some Platonic Recollections,”inPlato’s Dialogues, 251, on her experience of listening to
Gilbert Ryle discuss the Sophist; Jill Gordon,Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic
Structure in Plato’s Dialogues, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 1–13.
3 Diskin Clay,Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher(University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2000),ix; Dorothy Tarrant,“Plato as Dramatist,”The Journal of Hellenic Studies 75
(1955): 82–9. For a“dramatic”criticism of an“argumentative”approach, see Clay’s review of Gregory
Vlastos’Platonic Studies,“Platonic Studies and the Study of Plato,”Arion: A Journal of Humanities and
the Classics2 (1975): 116–32; Ruby Blondell,The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), chapter 1,“Drama and Dialogue,” 1 – 52, especially pp. 31–4on
comedy; William H. Johnson,“Dramatic Frame and Philosophic Idea in Plato,”The American Journal
of Philology119 (1998): 577–98; Louis Dyer,“Plato as Playwright,”Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology12 (1901): 165–80.
4 Most notably in Leo Strauss,The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws(Chicago: University of
ChicagoPress,1975).
5 I useFour Texts on Socrates: Plato and Aristophanes, Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West, trans.
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). For the Greek text I usedPlato’s“Euthyphro,”“Apology of
Socrates”and“Crito,”John Burnet, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970).Socratic Method and Existence 29