After Socrates’illustration of how to properly define or articulate the idea of a thing through his
discussion of shape and color, Meno attempts for the third time to say what virtue is: it is“to desire
beautiful things and have the power to acquire them”(77b). Thus, we are back to Meno’ssecond
definition–virtue is power or ruling–but now power is reduced to a means to an end, the acquisition
of beautiful things. Socrates’refutation proceeds by equating the beautiful with the good, and then
getting Meno to agree that all persons actually desire what they believe to be good. Even if persons
desire what is actually bad, they are misguided and believe that what they desire is good and will be
beneficialtothemand make them happy. Yet, ifall persons desirewhattheybelieve tobegoodthen to
desire good things doesn’t distinguish human beings and hence cannot be virtue (77b–78b). Meno,
sharing Socrates’assumption that virtue is something that distinguishes or separates human beings,
agreestomodifyinghisthirddefinitionofvirtuetobe“thepowerofsecuringgoodthings”(78c).Ifthe
desire for good things does not distinguish human beings, the power to acquire them does.
Settling on this revised version of his third definition, Meno, in response to Socrates’questions,
affirms that virtue requires that good things such as wealth and public office be acquired justly and
piously.If acquiredthroughinjusticeandimpiety,suchacquisitionis vice.Virtue,therefore,according
tothedefinition,isactuallyjusticeandpiety,but,similartowhatwasagreedtobefore,justiceandpiety
areparticularexamplesofvirtueamongothers(78c–79b).Meno,inhisthirdattempttosaywhatvirtue
is, has again given particular examples of virtue rather than the nature or idea of virtue itself.
After three attempts to say what virtue is, Meno has not been able to provide an answer that
articulates the idea of virtue or the universal characteristic that all the particular examples of virtue
that he mentions share. They must, therefore, return to the question with which they started:“What
is virtue?”Meno, however, is hesitant because Socrates, like a“torpedo fish,”has made him
“numb.”According to Meno:
Before I even met you [Socrates], I used to hear that you are always in a state of perplexity and
that you bring others to the same state, and now I think you are bewitching and beguiling me,
simply putting me under a spell, so that I am quite perplexed. Indeed, if a joke is in order, you
seem, in appearance and in every other way, to be like the broad torpedo fish, for it too makes
anyone who comes close and touches it feel numb, and you now seem to have had that kind of
effecton me, for both my mind and my tongue are numb, and I have noanswer to give you. Yet I
have made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very
good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is (80a–b).Socrates’questions, Meno indicates, show you that you don’t know what you thought you knew,
suchaswhatvirtue is,and arelikethe touch of thetorpedofishthatmakesyourmindandtongue numb
so you cannot speak. Emptying his interlocutors of their false opinions, Socrates gives them know-
ledge of their own ignorance that leaves them not knowing what to say. Socrates’interlocutors such as
Meno,therefore,arebroughttothesameconditioninwhichSocratesbegins theApologyandwhichhe
tries to give to the reputedly wise men he questions: at least having knowledge that you do not indeed
know what you thought you knew (seeApology,21b–d).
Recollection
Socrates assures Meno that if he, like a torpedo fish, perplexes others, he himself is perplexed and
does not know what virtue is, yet still wishes to seek together with Meno for the answer. In response,
Meno asks
How will you look for it Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim for
something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the
thing that you did not know? (80d).52 Ann Ward