CONTENDING CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE AND POLITICS 49nality of science” while engaging Kuhn’s critique of positivism and critical rationalism. Lakatos recognized
the critical role played by a scientific research community in shaping a “research program” and the role that
presuppositions play in shaping the negative heuristic (inviolable assumptions) and positive heuristic (ques-
tions for investigation and accredited methods of inquiry). But like his teacher, mentor, and colleague Karl
Popper, Lakatos did not break definitively from an instrumentalist conception of theory or the correspon-
dence theory of truth. Thus neither Popper nor Lakatos fits the definition of “postpositivist” developed here.
- Lakatos (1976) recognized that scientific theories could not be conclusively falsified and devised
several strategies to circumvent this problem. He introduced a distinction between the theory’s “hard core”
or “negative heuristic,” which was not subject to refutation, and its auxiliary hypotheses, which could be
falsified. He also argued that the falsification of auxiliary hypotheses need not justify the immediate aban-
donment of a “useful theory.” Instead he recommended that useful theories be allowed to “prove their mettle”
over time, that is, that scientists evaluate the “progressive” or “degenerative” nature of the research program
by assessing how the theory responds to anomalies (unfulfilled predictions) and unexplained phenomena by
introducing modifications in the “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses. Although “degenerative” research
programs—those whose explanatory power shrinks as ad hoc hypotheses proliferate—ought to be aban-
doned, “progressive” research programs, which continue to maintain or increase their explanatory power
despite falsification of some hypotheses, ought to be preserved.