62 MEANING AND METHODOLOGY
recurring relationships of coexistence or sequence between conceptually isolated macro factors.
To anyone who doubts at least one of these presuppositions—which includes, but is not limited
to, most interpretive social scientists—this use of comparison may seem misguided for any of a
number of reasons. Which, if any, alternative uses of comparison are preferred will depend on the
broader standpoint from which such criticism comes. Thus, for example, Charles Tilly (1997) has
argued forcefully for redirecting comparative inquiry to focus on formulating and evaluating
propositions about recurrent causal mechanisms at more micro levels. However, for interpretive
social scientists concerned to construct general perspectives, the preference is, in contrast, for
uses of comparison not framed by the notion of recurring connections that remains just as essen-
tial for Tilly’s stance as it is for macro-causal analysis. To flesh out what this might involve we
can turn to the works of Geertz and Bendix for examples of how comparison may be employed in
connection with other conceptions of the “general.”
A key practice of Geertz and Bendix in this regard pivots around the notion of a problem (a
task, a challenge, etc.). By conceptualizing problems with some degree of abstraction, they con-
struct frameworks in which developments in different societies are presented and compared as
alternative responses to a common problem. They conceptualize some problems in universal
terms. Thus, for example, both conceptualize legitimation as a challenge facing the political au-
thorities in all societies (Bendix 1978, 16–18, 60; Geertz 1983, 142–43). Other problems are
conceptualized as general to a certain setting. Thus, for example, in framing a comparative study
of authority under kings, Bendix (1978, 4, 7) conceptualizes a “tension between central authority
and local government” that he sees as general to the setting of monarchical rule. At whatever level
of abstraction it is pitched, Bendix and Geertz wield their problem-centered practice in a way that
is distinctively open to contingency. The comparisons they construct with it tend to highlight the
range and diversity of particular responses to any one “general” problem. This emphasis is sup-
ported by a characteristic way of deploying historical perspective. Bendix and Geertz treat actors
as responding to general problems within specific historical contexts, where legacies of the past
shape their perceptions, both of the problem itself and of possible responses to it. Such contextual
attention to the views of actors is essential here, since for an interpretivist, an account that pre-
sents actors as responding to a “general” problem will only be persuasive to the extent that its
abstract formulation of that problem can also be unpacked as a redescription of some “particular”
concrete problem(s) that those actors see themselves as responding to.
Attending to the use of problems as a conceptual hinge around which comparative and histori-
cal contrasts come together within a general perspective illuminates much about the approach of
Geertz and Bendix. It has broader ramifications also. By recognizing that their problem-centered
practice exemplifies one distinctive way of engaging the general, we are put in a position to
explore the broader potential of this mode of engagement for interpretive social science by fol-
lowing up on resemblances to this practice in the work of other interpretivists. Such an explora-
tion is beyond the scope of this chapter, but some hints are possible. We might, for example, turn
to Susanne Rudolph’s brief for the comparative study of state formation in Asia and note that a
conceptualization of a general problem underpins her suggestion as to how the history of North
Indian states might be compared with that of China. She suggests, in particular, a comparative
history framed around responses to the problem of how to sustain the integration of an empire and
its component regional kingdoms (Rudolph 1987, 731). Turning to the domain of more contem-
porary policy-oriented studies, we might reflect on how the problem-centered practice explored
in this chapter relates to the concept of a dilemma that Mark Bevir, Rod Rhodes, and Patrick
Weller advocate using in the interpretive study of comparative governance (2003a, 2003b).
A focus on problems is not, however, the only way in which interpretive social scientists may