The Shape of Theological Humanism
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now called neohumanism, intimations of which we have noted above. Neohumanist thinkers like Todorov, no less than Levinas, show that, onto-logically considered, the “I” that is the goal of action includes the other Accounts of situated freedom have allowed for the emergence of what is
human being, the finality of the “you.” Autonomy is important, but the self is always situated with respect to the moral claim of the other and also the finality of the human community. Human beings exceed, overcome, or tran-scend their given existence in response to the human other, and the human
other alonebonds of existence on this earth. This is called lateral or inner-worldly tran-scendence. Here, too, there are differences among neohumanists important for theological humanism. Levinas, for instance. The proper aim of life is the well-being of human beings within the , finds a trace of the divine in
the encounter with the face of the other; Todorov denies the reality of the divine and insists on intrahuman goods and these goods alone.scendence,” beyond intrahuman ends? Must we see that our inner-worldly In order to avoid overhumanization, must we think beyond “lateral tran-
relations are the prisms or traces for a relation to the divine? Does responsi-bility for the other human reveal what exceeds, transgresses, the kingdom of human power? The claim of the other person is thus an opening to a realm of value more extensive and intensive than intrahuman goods. The challenge
is then to fashion a form of thought and way of life that respects and enhances the integrity of human existence within but not against other forms of life. In a word, can we show why inner-worldly neohumanism and the legacies of anti-humanism are finally inadequate as visions of the moral vocation of
our lives? These positions, we hold, lead to a flattening of the world that misses the depth and reach of human existence. Theological humanism intensifies and widens the account of human transcendence in relation to the reality of the integrity of life. The space of the integrity of life as the full-
ness of being includes but also exceeds lateral transcendence. To make our case for that account is the challenge of the rest of this book. religious tradition function to articulate and respond to the plight that befalls It is at this juncture that the symbolic and conceptual resources of a 43
human beings in a flattened world.minative power to decode the complexity of human action and the space of life. Yet it must also be said that a theological humanist is suspicious of deploying any one master metaphor as sufficient to articulate the aim and^44 The religions have diagnostic and illu-
purpose of life. A religious tradition as well as every human life is more complex than one root metaphor, say, a garden or school or theatre. Many metaphors are necessary and actually exist in a moral lexicon, while none alone exhausts the meaning of life and its worth. Theological humanism