On the Integrity of Life
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circumstances and for good reasons be overridden.the gist of this point, even if, as a secular neohumanist, he constricts the reach of responsibility only to other human beings. “The universality of the they seems, then, to be the counterpoint of the membership of all^5 Tzvetan Todorov gets
human beings, and they alone, in the same living species.”logical humanist, the most basic and most inclusive membership is not a species but, rather, the community of life, a community that evokes sym-pathy and reaches from the organic to the divine. The realm of basic goods^6 For the theo-
exceeds what Todorov and other neohumanists usually imagine. The point is that the dynamics of physical life.the world at the simplest level of sensible life and yet are also linked to universality becomes self-evident when we attend and are attuned to (^7) Basic goods, then, situate human beings in
other levels of goods that must be properly integrated if life is to endure and to flourish.on action and choice, and yet action and choice in concert with others. There is also a distinct realm of social goods. These goods obviously depend
Human existence – and the life of many other creatures – is profoundly social. Human existence always and everywhere entails standards, customs, rites, practices, and beliefs, which communities develop in order to under-stand and to guide life. These are social inventions, the work of social imagi-
nation and labor, which guide interactions within the social and natural environments. They include such things as family, economic and political institutions (of whatever form), friendship, patterns of interaction with other species, and even the means to think, speak, and act together with others.
from other goods. They are forms of human excellence and well-being associated with fidelity to the well-being of others, the common good. Insofar as goods must be protected, used, enjoyed, and distributed, then We call these “social goods” to denote the relation to and yet distinction
social norms are own status. One cannot act against social goods without endangering the conditions of cooperative thinking, speaking, and acting. There is also a vulnerability found in social goods, namely, the vulnerability to distortion, obviously important. Yet the realm of the social has its
injustice, and social oppression. These vulnerabilities, and also the vitality of social existence, impinge at another level of experience or attunement to life. As social beings, we are moved by a desire for recognition and are vulnerable to shame. Recognition and shame situate human beings in social
realities. The bonds of our humanity come to rise in a sense of benevolence for others. But these senses are also open to distortion, like when racist policy breeds shame for one’s very being or sexism fosters hatred of one’s gender. Benevolence, too, can be stunted or destroyed.