desert one sees nothing but the vast expanse that surrounds them, and in
the solitude, there is a kind of lack of perception so that one does not fully
see even one’s self. We might say that Derrida’s description of this un-
encountered self is a kind of Hegelian subject, the pure being that exists
without any determination so that it has not yet even observed itself. 22
But, when the moment comes that the pure being sees itself, there is a
force that is exacted over the pure being, and in that moment the pure
being, recognizing that it is being, becomes determined, and it moves into
existence. This Hegelian notion about the moment of becoming is repre-
sented by Derrida as the moment of arrival. The force that is exacted over
the pure being is precisely the mere presence of the other.
In the moment of becoming, one is not witnessing the effect of a word,
or of an act on behalf of the other. Rather, it is the simple appearance of the
other whose effect we witness. Certainly, an arrival can be read as an act, but
there is something more primal being alluded to here. The arrival in itself is
not an act of communication of the type that one might imagine as a part of
the mundane interactions that one participates in with colleagues: the greet-
ing in passing while walking down a corridor, the deference to allow the
other to pass. No, the arrival of the other occurs in silence, suddenly, without
deference. The other blocks one’s way, does nothing but stand there. In the
silent standing the gaze of the other unsettles. This sudden presence is the
arrival of an alterity that cannot be anticipated, expected or imagined. One
does not see the approach off in the distance; there is no horizon that offers
any hint of the impending presence that will soon set itself upon oneself. 23
Yet, to say that one cannot anticipate the approach of the other is not
to say that one does nothing to prepare for it, or that there is no anticipa-
tion. For indeed Derrida speaks of preparations and anticipations. But one
cannot here imagine preparation to be akin to setting the table; that would
be a kind of expectation that misses the level of disruption that Derrida
wants us to pay attention to. No, there are no preparations of that sort
implicated in the preparing for the other. Anticipation in this Derridean
sense is not expectation, per se, but is a more ambiguous orientation to
the world and to oneself. The Derridean manner of preparation is an
unknown anticipation. We await without realizing that we await. To be is
to already be awaiting. To exist is to assume a stance of anticipation. Such
an anticipatory stance might be stated as that way in which humans have
their being. That is to say that the characteristic feature of being human is
that we think our own being, and thus in thinking our being we remain in
a relational stance to Being: a stance of response, of anticipation. 24
58 J. VAZQUEZ