Constructive Pneumatological Hermeneutics in Pentecostal Christianity

(Barry) #1
There is no way to conceptualize the encounter: it is made possible by the
other, the unforeseeable “resistant to all categories.” Concepts suppose an
anticipation, a horizon within which alterity is amortized as soon as it is
announced precisely because it has let itself be foreseen. The infi nitely-other
cannot be bound by a concept, cannot be thought on the basis of a horizon;
for a horizon is always a horizon of the same, the elementary unity within
which eruptions and surprises are always welcomed by understanding and
recognized. 34

If language is a key to encounter, can we think exteriority separate from

space? I do not mean to suggest that the space of encounter betrays the

exteriority of the other and leaves the other exposed and totally uncon-

cealed. But, if language is constitutive of the encounter, language must

exist for the self and the other, outside of both, in the space in between,

and thus allow for a kind of sameness that nurtures the encounter with

the alterity of the other. 35 For Derrida, the other deconstructs the self,

unsettles the self by revealing the here-ness of the self and the there-ness

of the other. The encounter teaches the self that it cannot exist only for

itself, but that it necessarily lives toward others.

WHEN LANGUAGE FAILS

Likewise the Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not know how to
pray as we ought, but that very Spirit intercedes for us with sighs too deep
for words.
Romans 8:26 (NRSV)

There is a common refrain in pentecostal worship that most often is a part

of the performance of testimony. This refrain is simply “I know that I know

that I know.” On the surface such a statement seems to be an attempt by

the speaker at declaring a kind of certainty in the face of doubt, particu-

larly when there seems to be no evidence or argument that might support

their claims. It may sound foolish to some, a mere refusal to accept the

“realities” of life. But Smith theorizes this refrain differently. He writes:

“I know that I know that I know” is an almost-nonsensical, quasi-glossolalic
mantra that is struggling to articulate what might be inarticulable—a sense
that there are ways of knowing that cannot be translated into propositions
or syllogisms. 36

62 J. VAZQUEZ

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