Here, too, wefind the doctrine of participation, which proved so important
for the social magisterium of Leo and John Paul. This doctrine enters into
Thomas’s famous definition of natural law:
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the
most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being
provident both for itself and for others. (91.2)Human action represents (with all due metaphysical qualifications)what God
and man do together. Having a created share in God’s providence, the human
person can go on to be provident for himself and others. John Paul called this
‘participated theonomy’.^11
What exists simply in God is communicated to creatures in a multiform
manner. Thus, a doubleimitation or portrayal. First, a diversity of created
things, each having a good according to its participated being. Second, a
diversity of created things imitating God insofar as they cause goodness in
others—insofar as they bring into existence, through secondary causality,
additional modes of participation among themselves and others. Charity
perfects a social principle embedded in the creation of angels and men:
namely, one loves the good not only as it is possessed and participated, but
even more as it is poured forth and communicated to many.^12 Natural law
includes both the dignity of the human agent, provident for himself, and the
capacity to participate in the diffusion of the good.^13
FROM INSTITUTIONAL TO
ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRISESWhile the two popes shared a number of common traits, the difference in
cultural situations to which they had to react, together with their divergent
(^11) Participated theonomy,Veritatis spendor§41; thenuncioof a king, §58 (citing Bonaventure,
In II Librum Sentent.dinst. 39, a. 1, q. 3); see also his discussion of theimago deibearing the kingly
predicate, §38 (citing Gregory of Nyssa,De hominis opificio, c. 4).
(^12) De caritate2,Summa contra GentilesIII, 113. See also Aquinas inSumma theologiaeI–II,
21.3, ad 1. In answer to the objection that‘good or evil actions are not all related to another
person, for some are related to the person of the agent’, Thomas replies:‘A man’s good or evil
actions, although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless
ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.’
(^13) We must, therefore, affirm two things about natural law. The image-bearer is given a
created share of perfection in the order of substance—the dignity of rational nature, capacitated
to be provident for himself, created unto the image of God. But also capacitated to be provident
for others, bringing about good in social relationships—thus the dignity ofsimilitudo, which is to
say, likeness, or the perfection of the image.
244 F. Russell Hittinger