This brings us back to the issue discussed in the opening para-
graphs of this book. Is there a conceptual link between justification
and recognition in Protestantism? The answer is both yes and no. Yes,
because the attachment emerges in the manner described above. No,
because the link is not simply found in any‘basic human need for
recognition’, as Jüngel formulates it.^184 And yet, for Luther, God
makes people truthful in justification, thus‘verifying’human exist-
ence. While this event of verification resembles modern processes of
recognition in important ways, we nevertheless need to see the
differences between Luther and post-Enlightenment conceptions.
These conceptions belong to different paradigms. We will return to
the definition of such paradigms in Chapter 4.
In terms of our conceptions of recognition, we may define R as a
variant that is not explicitly called recognition in the sources but
which resembles the act of recognition in important ways. Given
this, a downward R may be taken as God’s act of justification by
faith, an act of‘verifying’the individual. The counterpart of this is the
complex human act ofagnosco, consisting of several dimensions: (i)
justifying God in the sense that the speaker lets God be God, (ii)
confession, (iii) faith. In addition to these, the individual also prac-
tises a new self-recognition, a reflexive and appropriative move
through which she is faithful and truthful.
While the appropriative move of self-recognition is found in both
Ficino and Luther, they conceive it very differently. For Ficino, this
move is epistemic and enables the individual tofind his true self. For
Luther, this move means a complete renunciation of the old self.
What the human response to divine R establishes is an attachment
to the gift of faith that is given by God in justification. Thus Luther’s
view is even more heteronomous than that of Ficino. As a result, the
divine act of justification is a performative R that entails a concep-
tion of identity constitution, that is, a massive heteronomous change
and conversion.
As stated in section 1.4, we reserve the more detailed discussion on
the theological content of the acts of recognition to Chapter 4. For the
present, my argument for treating Luther with the help of R* is based
on the terminological appearance ofagnoscoandcommendoin the
immediate context of justification.
(^184) Jüngel 2006, 4–5 (cf. section 1.1 in this volume).
96 Recognition and Religion