‘to beleeve what is said, signifieth only an opinion of the truth of
the saying’.^9
To‘believe in’is a special phrase used only in religious speech. For
Hobbes,‘by Beleeving in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in
the Person, but Confession and acknowledgement (agnitionem
sive confessionem) of the Doctrine’.^10 In this manner‘believing in’
emphasizes the non-personal object of belief; at the same time, the
phrase contains the subjective, personal conviction ofagnosco. Given
the broader context of belief as opinion that remains separated
from knowledge, the aspect of acknowledgement is again subjective,
autonomous, and even ratherfideistic. Hobbes remarks that such
belief represents an argument from authority, a trust in God and
the church.^11
These passages allow us to conclude that the concept of acknow-
ledgement in Hobbes is markedly different from the old tradition
ofagnitio veritatis,‘knowledge of the truth’. While this tradition
considers that the recognition of the truth emerges heteronomously
and leads to a fuller understanding of reality, Hobbes thinks that
acknowledgementis a subjectiveopinion emergingautonomouslyinthe
subject and, accordingly, remains less than knowledge. This being said,
Hobbes also continues the Augustinian tradition of legal–personal
attachment, as Hoekstra rightly observes. For Hobbes, acknowledge-
ment expresses an individual conviction, something that a person
admits or confesses even though he cannot prove it by natural reason
or demonstrate it to others.
As acknowledgement is not a very frequent concept in Hobbes, we
should not draw too far-reaching conclusions. While my claims
support Hoekstra’sfindings, the entire tradition ofagnosco/agnitio
is not as subjectivist as Hoekstra’s remarks suggest. Hobbes
undertakes an‘autonomization’of the concept that has its roots in
Augustine and Calvin, making religious acknowledgement an indi-
vidual attribution, an opinion formed and adopted through an act of
subjective belief. While this act is often performed in a group, as in
confessing a creed or acknowledging the equality of all people, its
epistemic status remains subjective and open to changes. At the same
time, it is noteworthy that the concept is employed in the context of
such an obviously modern value as equality.
(^9) Leviathan, 7, 100–1. (^10) Leviathan, 7, 100–3.
(^11) Leviathan, 7, 102–3.
The Modern Era 113