concerns the idea of property. Like Fichte, Hegel considers that
property rights do not emerge absolutely but in relation to others.^108
In a philosophical extension of this relationality, Hegel pays attention
to the‘inequality of power of life’that is found in such a community.
He calls this the relationship between lord and servant.^109 The lord
has the surplus of goods, while the servant lacks even necessary goods.
On the other hand, the relationship between husband and wife in an
institution like the family does involve an unequal relationship which
is nevertheless personal and contractual.^110
InSystem der Sittlichkeit, the concept of recognition is for the most
part elaborated in passages dealing with the conflicts caused by the
denial or dissolution of mutual recognition. Not only acts like stealing
another person’s property, but also immaterial acts like insulting
someone are examples of this kind.^111 In such acts, the honour of
a person is violated because they concern the‘personality and totality’.^112
While common acts of achieving lordship or suffering servanthood
witness to the‘struggle’that recognition involves, violation of honour
or murder dissolve the relationship of recognition.^113
Hegel is dependent on Fichte here, but he also develops the notion
of recognition into a stronger heteronomy, distinguishing between
the spheres of family, state, and working life, in each of which
recognition is displayed in a particular way.^114 The famous image of
lord and servant is introduced in theSystem der Sittlichkeit, but, as
Schmidt points out,^115 Hegel does not lay out their mutual heteron-
omy. The concept of recognition is mostly used in this work, similar
to Fichte, to highlight the situations of right and law.
The most abundant evidence regarding Hegel’suseofAnerkennung
is provided in theGeistesphilosophiesection ofJena Realphilosophie
(1805/6). This work expands the analysis initiated in System der
Sittlichkeit; it is also the cornerstone of Axel Honneth’stheoryof
recognition. As Ludwig Siep and Honneth point out, Hegel here goes
significantly beyond Fichte, developing a philosophy in which individ-
uals and primary social institutions are defined in terms of mutual
(^108) System der Sittlichkeit, 298–9. All translations from Hegel are my own.
(^109) System der Sittlichkeit, 305. (^110) System der Sittlichkeit, 307–8.
(^111) System der Sittlichkeit, 315–16. (^112) System der Sittlichkeit, 318–19.
(^113) System der Sittlichkeit, 319–20.
(^114) Cf. Honneth 1992, 30–46 and Siep 2014, 195–203.
(^115) Schmidt 1997, 357–8.
The Modern Era 137