somebody who acquires (erwerbend).^133 The structures of acquiring
(Erwerb) are manifold and lead to contracts and property.^134 In the
property emerging from labour, the contracts and the right, the fact of
being recognized is validated by the state. The recognition of law also
means the recognition of the common will of all in society.^135
Axel Honneth remarks that Hegel inJena Realphilosophieexplains
how moral and legal recognition is constituted in the human con-
sciousness. He does not, however, develop a truly intersubjective
conception in which the ideas on solidarity, esteem, and individual
rights are significant. As Hegel’sPhänomenologieno longer empha-
sizes moral and individual consciousness but focuses on social devel-
opment, this basic constitution of recognition is not developed to its
full maturity.^136
This judgement by Honneth helpfully illuminates his own position
and the contemporary development of the theory of recognition. At
the same time, Hegel obviously undertakes a highly original and
creative development of Fichte’s concept of recognition, coming to
the conclusion that the concept of the person in legal relationships as
well as in the family and society emerges in a truly intersubjective
fashion. Hegel’s concept of recognition is very different from that of
Spalding as well as of Hobbes and Locke. While these thinkers
consider acknowledgement/Anerkennungas an autonomous affirm-
ation of the existing subject, Hegel emphasizes the heteronomous
constitution of the person due to the event of being recognized.
This idea has affinities with the older religious tradition of recogni-
tion; we will discuss them after a brief look at thePhänomenologie des
Geistes(1807). In this brief look, I will only present a very simplified
account that focuses on the understanding of the concept.^137
The‘pure notion of recognition’is for Hegel illustrated in the event
in which the consciousness and the other‘recognize themselves as
recognizing one another mutually’(anerkennen sich als gegenseitig
sich anerkennend).^138 Such a pure notion resembles Hegel’s view of
(^133) Jenaer Realphilosophie, 231.GW8, 242.
(^134) Jenaer Realphilosophie, 233–4.GW8, 244–5.
(^135) Jenaer Realphilosophie, 234–5.GW8, 245–7.
(^136) Honneth 1992, 103–4.
(^137) The various layers ofAnerkennunginPhänomenologieare elaborated e.g. by
Siep 2014, 108–55.
(^138) Phänomenologie des Geistes, 147.
140 Recognition and Religion