independence of the Netherlands by the Spanish king (who uses the
verbreconnaîtreto describe this act) in 1648 is often considered as the
first act of this kind. In the latter part of the nineteenth century,
various congresses and treaties agree about the need for collective
recognition of territorial changes.^239
Legal theorists have long disputed whether such institutional rec-
ognition has merely a ‘declaratory’or a‘constitutive’effect. The
declarative view largely prevails nowadays, being generally held that
while recognition may settle disputes about sovereignty, the state has
the right to defend its integrity before official acts of recognition.^240 It
may be misleading, however, to seek deeply philosophical principles
behind this pragmatic discussion. In addition to the independence of
a new state, other states can recognize new governments, provisional
situations, and territorial changes. The influence of the United
Nations has meant that the recognition of international organizations
is also discussed in international law nowadays.^241 Recognition of
belligerency and insurgence are examples of recognizing an act or
state of affairs.^242
The treaties between states and other similar actors provide a
distant parallel to the agreements between religious communities,
such as the ecumenical agreements between churches. While treaties
provide a measure of international recognition and enforcement of
judgements, they are not normally characterized in terms of recogni-
tion, but simply as treaties.^243 The binding force of treaties emerges
from the intention of the partners who make a treaty with full powers.
A ratification procedure ensures that the treaty is approved by local
authorities and exchanged properly with the partners. In addition, the
general idea that‘treaties are to be observed’is needed.^244 As treaties
assume well-defined parties and clear domains of application, their
relationship with the philosophical and social processes of recogni-
tion remains somewhat distant. In this sense, they differ from the
ecumenical agreements that often define and even constitute an initial
understanding between the parties.
The legal recognition of persons is normally conceived as one of
basic human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(^239) Frowein 2000, 34; he also quotes the statement of 1648 here.
(^240) Frowein 2000, 35. See also Crawford 2012, 144–6.
(^241) Frowein 2000, 38–9. (^242) Riedel 2000, 54–6.
(^243) Lipstein 2000, 41–5. (^244) Crawford 2012, 371–7.
The Modern Era 165