knowledge-based, and in some sense self-contained nature of self-
recognition, the model of relational self-discovery stresses its heter-
onomous, relational, and performative character. In this model,
promises of faith and love do not appear in terms of memory, but
rather as performative otherness that leads to new discoveries. In this
sense, the concept of promise as employed in the present study differs
considerably from that of Ricoeur. While I see that Ricoeur also
mentions otherness and performatives in his discussion on the prom-
ise,^69 I consider that the category of promise belongs to a model that
is different from the tradition of memory and recollection.
The observed difference between introspective self-consciousness
and relational self-discovery may also be helpful when we discuss the
relationship between the classical philosophical issue of‘knowing
oneself’and our historicalfindings. As the maxims‘know thyself’
ornosce te ipsumhave become applied to a great variety of issues in
Western intellectual history, this relationship cannot be defined in
very precise terms. One classical problem asks how we can know
(a) the external world and (b) our own inner or mental world but not
(c) the inner world of other minds.^70
This problem resembles the Augustinian model of introspection
and memory. I know myself since my memory has collected my
experiences and I can preserve my identity through comparing my
new experiences to those stored in the memory. I cannot, however, do
this with regard to other minds. Given this, the Augustinian model of
‘recognizing myself’refers to the mental identification that allows
me to know myself in terms of previous mental states. The model
of introspective recollection is thus an aspect of the larger issue of
self-knowledge.
The second model of relational self-discovery does not seem to be
connected with the issue of knowing myself; that is, the coherence of
my inner mental states, in the same way. Rather, the model applies an
idea of gift transfer that is present in the feudal bond as well as in
bridal mysticism. In terms of Table 4.2, Ficino’s lover B receives‘a gift
from another’, that is, the beloved A. In addition, the visual image of
A is an almost archetypal presentation of B’s own inner self. There-
fore, what B receives through the visual image is also‘a gift of himself
(^69) Ricoeur 2005, 127–8.
(^70) For this and similar issues, see Gertler 2008 and Hatzimoysis 2011.
Recognition in Religion 239