psychological constitution (psy) or the status (sta) of a person. As a
rule, the former is a stronger transformation than the latter, but these
alternatives also qualitatively represent various possible conceptuali-
ties assumed in an act of recognition (mental vs legal/social concepts).
Given all these distinctions, there may be a great many combinations
in the changes in the subject and the object. For instance, recognizing
the citizenship of an immigrant may be considered as (cau-o-sta).
Falling in love might be considered as (cau-s-psy).^82
In hisfinal observations, Ikäheimo discusses the personhood of the
recognizer(s) in ways that resemble ourfindings. Referring to Hegel’s
views, he claims that the ability to recognize others shapes and even
constitutes the mature personality of the recognizer in important
ways (e.g. cau-s-sta or ont-s-psy). Through such acts of intersubject-
ive recognition, the individual learns to conceive himself in a
balanced way as one person among many.^83 As evidence for this
view, Ikäheimo refers to psychopathic and sociopathic personalities,
arguing that such mental disorders witness deficiencies in person-
making psychological capacities. Through performing acts of recogni-
tion, the persons can become‘fully human’and avoid such disorders.^84
While I do not want to take a stance on the psychological claim of
maturity as such, the present study strongly suggests the phenom-
enon of intersubjective attachment as the basis of social personhood.
Since Cicero, such attachment has been related to sociality and
oikeiosis, phenomena that constitute persons as social beings (section
2.3). Historically, religious recognition is concerned with the recog-
nizer’s ability to attach herself to larger realities, constituting and
preserving herself in terms of social bonding.
In addition to this important affinity, we might classify ourfindings
in terms of Ikäheimo’s differentiations. During thefirst and second
paradigms, we are clearly concerned with the psychological constitution
of the recognizer (s-psy) rather than merely her status (s-sta). Whether
this represents a causal (cau) or an ontological (ont) constitution is
difficult to judge. The strongest instances, for instance Ficino’s self-
recognition through love (section 2.5) and Luther’sviewofbecoming
verified (section 2.6), are probably ontological (ont-s-psy).
In the third paradigm, the existential attachment affects the status of
the recognizer (s-sta) rather than his constitution. When Spalding
(^82) Cf. Ikäheimo 2014, 18, 23–6. The examples are mine.
(^83) Ikäheimo 2014, 185. (^84) Ikäheimo 2014, 185–6.
Recognition in Religion 245