A gives a kind of surrogate of herself to B. Such an act calls for reciprocity
in which B consents to receive the gift and prepares a return.^40
Hénaff adopts Malinowski’s concept of the‘ceremonial gift’to
define a proper gift that manages to produce recognition. The cere-
monial giving needs to be performed publicly and with certain festive
forms. Both the handing over of the material token and the accom-
panying gestures are needed to make the gift ceremonial. These
features have a symbolic value since they make recognition visible.
At the same time they cannot be reduced to this symbolic dimension,
for instance, by simply wishing well to the other or saying‘I like you.’
Only the material transfer manages to symbolize the idea of the giver
giving something of herself.^41
The ceremonial dimension is important for Hénaff, since he wants
to create a distance from the classical philosophical theory of Seneca,
according to whom only the friendly intention matters in gift-giving.^42
While philosophers tend to bypass the external and ceremonial
dimensions, anthropologists see how they are necessary in order that
the symbolic dimension should be preserved. Hénaff distinguishes
between two layers of recognition in this ceremonial event. First, the
giver identifies the recipient as similar to him- or herself. Second,
and most importantly, the giver approves of the recipient and shows
respect to him. Hénaff claims that both layers of recognitive gift-giving
can also be found among the higher animals.^43
What is distinctive in interhuman recognition is the ability to attach
ceremonial gestures to these two layers. Human beings can create a
great variety of ceremonies of gift exchange. In all these varieties,
however, some invariants occur, such as the identification of the other
as companion and the respect shown to him or her. The complexity of
approaching the other, recognizing and accepting her, as well as the
reciprocity associated with these events are all displayed in the cere-
monies. The ceremonial dimension thus gives meaning to the event of
mutual recognition, making grasping its different aspects easier.^44
Hénaff claims that his notion of recognition differs from the
Hegelian tradition in an important respect: he is not describing a
struggle for recognition but a playful and‘seducing’event. Hegel
exemplifies the conflictual relationship of modern individuals in
(^40) Hénaff 2010, 124–33. (^41) Hénaff 2010, 132–4.
(^42) Hénaff 2010, 257–65. Seneca,De beneficiis. (^43) Hénaff 2010, 131.
(^44) Hénaff 2010, 131–2.
Introduction 13