Moreover, we have emphasized in section 4.2 that this relationality
does not primarily take place within an already existing institution
(such as patronage) but it occurs as constitutive relationality. In other
words, the act of recognition creates the qualified relationship and its
partners. This feature of constitutive relationality means that religious
recognition initiates or creates social structures rather than being an
event taking place within an established structure. For this reason,
the images of gift-giving, love, and servanthood both initiate and
manifest social reality. As constitutive relational events, such images
of recognition create new bonds rather than perpetuating existing
bonds in a ceremonial fashion.
This phenomenon of constitutive relationality was conspicous
before modernity and postmodernity. Contemporary political and
philosophical theories sometimes overstate the achievements of mod-
ernity, assuming that relationality andfluctuating subjecthood were
only invented in late modern times. The ideas of social attachment,
the feudal bond, and bridal love express this phenomenon in the
medieval Latin texts. Obviously, these expressions are not identical
with late modern philosophical elaborations, but they are neverthe-
less significant views that become later reflected in the thought of
Hegel (section 3.3) and Bultmann (section 3.4), for instance.
4.5.5. Aims of RecognitionIn addition to the‘ways’of recognition outlined in this study, we
finally need to ask about its‘aims’. What does religious recognition
want to achieve? Can its aims be compared with those of contem-
porary political philosophy, which employs recognition to tackle such
issues as multiculturalism, universal respect, and personal esteem?
The classical aims of religious recognition are greatly concerned
with the personal development of the recognizer. Through recogniz-
ing a higher religious reality, a person’s mind changes and she
redefines herself (cau-s-psy). While there is also some status change
in the recognized reality, the primary aim concerns the personal
identity of the recognizer. This is different from modern‘identity
politics’in which acts of recognition typically redefine the recognized
persons (cau-o-psy or cau-o-sta), aiming to integrate them into the
reality of which the recognizer already is a part.
On the other hand, this difference may not be so dramatic asfirst
appears. Both classical religious recognition and modern political
Recognition in Religion 247