Christian doctrine as a conversation partner of the theories of recog-
nition. Hoffmann has a clear theoretical preference, employing and
developing Hénaff’s approach and defending it against Honneth’s
criticism. She also associates some ideas from Bedorf’s theory with
Hénaff’s understanding of gift and recognition.^71 For these reasons,
her work is particularly significant for the present study. I will restrict
my discussion to Hoffmann’s concept of the‘gift of recognition’and
its application to the theology of justification.
Hoffmann remarks that we need to read Hénaff with the help of
Ricoeur; otherwise, Hénaff’s ideas remain fragmentary and even
unclear.^72 For her own theological elaboration, she formulates the
concept of the‘gift of recognition’. This phrase summarizes Hénaff’s
idea of the ceremonial gift and the dimensions of peaceful mutuality
and interpersonality associated with it by Ricoeur.^73 Hoffmann
claims that this concept contains four important features that,
taken as a whole, manage to avoid some traditionally controversial
alternatives.
First, she agrees with Hénaff that both the‘economic’and the
‘moral’interpretations of the gifts given and received are too narrow
to grasp the reality of the gift of recognition. Recognition cannot be
counted in terms of economic exchange. As a ceremonial act, recog-
nition is not a moral debt or obligation. For Hénaff, the gift does not
generate moral debt but something like an obligation to circulate the
gifts or a need for gratitude. Such obligations are not properly speak-
ing moral or economic. Theological models of giving and receiving
need to realize a new category to which recognition belongs.^74
Second, the gift of recognition cannot be reduced to a simple
unilaterality or a simple reciprocity. This gift manifests itself as an
asymmetrical relationship containing features of both alternatives.
Third, recognition proceeds from person to person and the gift
contains something of the giver. For this reason, a simple distinction
between a person and a thing or work is not adequate. Fourth, the
distinctions between egoism and altruism, and between non-merited
and meritorious actions, are also inadequate when we speak of the gift
of recognition. This gift assumes that both parties do something, but
this doing cannot be summarized in moral or economic terms.^75
(^71) Hoffmann 2013. (^72) Hoffmann 2013, 279–80.
(^73) Hoffmann 2013, 280. (^74) Hoffmann 2013, 217–18, 280. Cf. Hénaff 2010.
(^75) Hoffmann 2013, 280–1.
22 Recognition and Religion