(R2: A establishes a better self-understanding)
Rdef: the cognitive content of self-recognition.In this formulation, R0 and R2 may not be necessary and therefore
appear in brackets. On the other hand, the general four-part scheme
of our gift transfer conception may also prompt the phrases R0 and
R2 even when they are not logically necessary. We need to return to
the more immediate interpretation of self-recognition; here I only
formulate its heuristic idea.
A related conception extensively discussed in recent studies is that of
identity constitution. Many current theorists stress the Hegelian heter-
onomous constitution of people and groups through acts of mutual
recognition. Honneth’s psychological considerations are a paradigmatic
example of this trend. Laitinen’s so-called ambitious view manifests this
idea regarding groups. In religious texts, the change in and constitution
of one’s own identity is a recurring theme. There is a theoretical
continuum from less demanding gift transfer conceptions towards
more demanding identity constitution models. While we can basically
keep the parts R0, R1, R2, and Rdef in the framework of this continuum,
we need to detect some additional features that signal when an identity
constitution is at stake.
This is not an easy task, since the idea of identity constitution is not
well defined. Again, I will restrict this heuristic discussion to some
pragmatic decisions and give two criteria of identity-constituting
recognition. Thefirst one concerns the nature of the gift transferred
or exchanged; in other words, the significance of the content of Rdef.
If the acts of recognition imply amassive changein how the recogni-
zee is cognitively understood, we may speak of identity constitution.
In some cases, this change may also pertain to the recognizer. The
second one concerns the experience ofconversionor a radical change
of mind, since if the recognizer (or sometimes the recognizee) is said
to go through such conversion, we can speak of identity constitution.
These are very robust criteria, as one could also argue that small
changes continually constitute one’s identity. They are rather meant
to help to discover the most relevant religious texts than to solve the
deep philosophical problems regarding the constitution of identity.
Moreover, at this point I do not discuss the‘changes’in the recognizer
and the recognizee in detail. I will return to this issue in Chapter 4.
The event of self-recognition in some cases can also be considered as
identity-constituting. My pragmatic aim is simply to claim that the
40 Recognition and Religion