Modern Railways – April 2019

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http://www.modern-railways.com April 2019 Modern Railways

for safety but performance is
just what you moan at others
about, why accept any risk?

THE LOSSES


It wasn’t only safety which Network
Rail was interested in, but the losses
in the system. An unintended
consequence of the pointless drive
to fit all trains with electricity meters
was that people realised that there
were losses in the system. This might
have been apparent anyway, as if
you shove thousands of amps down
a lump of steel it warms up – that
is the losses. It happens in a copper
wire too, but much less because
higher voltage means less current for
a given power. Power is the voltage
and current multiplied together,
but the losses are proportional to
the square of the current, which
is where the problem lies.
Now while these losses were
hidden in the overall electricity bill
nobody cared, but now the train
operators had worked out they
were paying for power that never
made it to the train, they started
getting uppity about it. Network Rail

argued that there wouldn’t be any
losses if there wasn’t a train pulling
current, but in the end they ended
up with the losses on their bill.
While this is bearable on the
25kV, it is quite a bill on the third rail,
where losses can, in the extreme,
get up to 20%. This is because
the system was designed around
four-car wooden bodied units with
a 1,000hp power car, but was now
being used by ‘power hungry lard
butts’ as my colleague Mr Ford
called them. I would of course say
they are crashworthy designs with
performance to enhance the railway
of the future. Short of laying fancy
conductor rails that are expensive
and very attractive to scrap metal
collectors, all you can do to correct
this is add more substations,
but more on this story later.

THE FALL


Of course we now know that 25kV
electrification is not as easy as the
video made it look. It ended up four
times the price it should have been
and got cancelled. We are now left in
a fantasy world where money goes
into looking for alternative power
sources nowhere near as efficient as
even a third rail. The case for third rail
conversion vanished like a metallised
balloon on a 25kV overhead. Even
if costs are controlled, the best
we can hope for is double the BR
figure – so the balloon is still burst.

SAFETY FIRST


The ORR edict states that there
are six times as many casualties
on the third rail than on the 25kV
system, which sounds pretty bad.
So let’s have a look at the statistics.
In the RSSB’s safety report for
2016-17 there is an accidental risk

profile, split between passengers,
workforce and public using ‘Fatalities
and Weighted Injuries’ (FWI) data.
In brief this means a fatality counts
as one, the same as 10 major
injuries, 200–1,000 minor injuries
(depending how serious they are)
and the same for shock/trauma.
So if 1,000 people cut themselves
on a raised screw head (and report
it) that is the same as a fatality.
I’m not mocking it, if you just
use fatalities there isn’t enough
data – this isn’t the road network.
Returning to 2016-17, electrocution
only shows up in the ‘workforce’
section, and even then scoring
0.5 FWI. For comparison, slips, trips
and falls in the workforce scores
10.1 FWI, while for passengers it scores
27.2. In the whole graph electrocution
is the smallest figure, although
trespass scores 33.5 (mainly suicides).
Going back a few years I can find
one unfortunate carriage cleaner
who was killed in a depot and
two passengers who fell from the
platform onto the live rail. In both
of these latter cases ‘alcohol was a
factor’, as it says in reports. Just to
be clear, I am not making light of
any injuries: they shouldn’t happen,
and if everyone does as they should,
they won’t. But we don’t live in a
perfect world – especially after dark.

MITIGATION – DEPOTS


To mitigate the risks we could modify
the edict to say ‘no additional third
rail depots’, which is easy because
we don’t need any to infill the
last Southern lines and perhaps
modestly extend the network.

MITIGATION – PUBLIC ACCESS


Stations and crossing areas are
the next risk area, and there is no

technical reason why these have to
remain live when there is no train
in them. The Bordeaux tram system
uses a ground pick-up system that is
only live when there is a tram on it.
The instant it has gone, people tread
on the contacts in complete safety.
For the main line railway,
people shouldn’t be there. But if
someone falls on the track as a
train approaches, their situation
is pretty bad anyway: the state of
the live rail is not really relevant.
I therefore suggest new third rail
stations are fitted with this ‘dead
rail’ technology, which I would
define as ‘only live when a train is
in section and for a maximum of
300 metres length ahead or behind
the train’. That would close out all of
the risks based on available data.
Also worth a mention is the
yellow line on the platform.
Originally this was to stand behind
when high-speed trains passed
the platform, but it seems to have
been promoted so that now to
step over it is to enter the death
zone, even if every train stops at the
platform. Staff are trained to yell
like gym teachers if you put a toe
over it, third rail or no third rail.

MITIGATION – TRESPASS


Trespass is a big problem with or
without the live rail, and the practice
of slowing or even stopping trains
when trespassers are sighted creates
a business case for the heavy-duty
fencing now seen around railways
anywhere near habitation. This
fencing closes out the electrocution
risks to trespassers. The policy should
just say that the railway should
‘be fenced to current standards’.
Occasionally track workers have
to go on the ‘live’ railway, but this is

Diesel island: Turbostar at Crowborough on the Uckfield branch on 10 May 2018. In his 2017 report on the
Southern network, Chris Gibb suggested 25kV wiring and dual-voltage units for this line. David Andrews

040-043_MR_Apr 2019_pan up 1.indd 41 12/03/2019 15:04

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