a contest of beneficence 93
prosociality means in the context of international relations. Hence, the
chapter opens with a short theoretical discussion of prosociality and its pos-
sible connections to conspicuous consumption. I then develop a conspicu-
ous consumption model of prosociality. Once the model is presented and
explained, I survey three empirical implications of prosociality as conspicu-
ous consumption: its connection to patterns of subordination and domina-
tion, its connection to conflict, and its interaction with class, mainly through
an exploration of middle- powers advocacy. The discussion weaves together
insights from anthropology, philosophy, economics, and evolutionary bi-
ology to provide a rich theoretical analysis of prosociality as conspicuous
consumption in international relations.
Rationalism and Prosociality
Prosociality is a voluntary action that aims to assist other actors (Baston
and Powell 2003 ). Benefitting others is not necessarily an altruistic act.
Instead, prosocial actors may profit from their actions as well. They may
receive material benefits, social benefits, or enjoy the warm glow of doing
the right thing. In this sense there is no necessary tension between pro-
sociality and rationalist models. An actor can help others as long as she
gains enough returns to justify the investment. Prosociality is therefore
defined not by acting contrary to one’s self- interest but by acting to ben-
efit another’s. Valavanis’s formulation offers a useful framework for our
purposes (Valavanis 1958 ; see also Frohlich 1974 ; Fitzgerald 1975 ). Vala-
vanis differentiates between two types of utility. The first is derived from
the consumption of goods, while the second, a vicarious utility, is obtained
from the welfare of other actors (Frohlich 1974 , 61 ).^5 In the extreme case
of “love thy neighbor as thyself,” for example, the actor derives the same
utility from her neighbor’s consumption of a unit of goods as she would
from her own consumption of it (Fitzgerald 1975 , 477 ). But this is not a
necessary condition for prosociality. Instead, an actor still shows prosocial
tendency when her neighbor’s consumption of a unit of goods provides
her with a fraction of the utility she would get from consuming the same
unit herself. This is true as long as her “vicarious utility” is positive for
an increase in the welfare of the other actor. Valavanis does not define
the source of this vicarious utility. It can be a result of ideology, psychol-
ogy, or some other form of positive retribution. In most economic studies
of prosociality, such vicarious effects are treated as externalities. An-
dreoni ( 1990 ) refers to the vicarious utility of prosociality as warm glow
