explaining conspicuous consumption 13
[ 1947 ] 1960 , 80 ). In fact, as O’Neill ( 1999 , 193 ) points out, the word pres-
tige originates from the Latin root praestare, meaning the creation of an
illusion. Similarly, Jervis ( 1989 , 10 ) labeled his study of image- enhancing
policies the “theory of deception in international relations.” Observers
are left with the task of sorting out which image- enhancing effort to be-
lieve and which to discount as trickery.
The establishment of a social hierarchy, therefore, involves an intri-
cate signaling game. Because prestige is awarded by the community, all
signals must be public, and conspicuous. Accordingly, social hierarchies
are the result of a continuous process of public displays and communal
assessments: “In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is not suf-
ficient merely to possess wealth or power. The wealth or power must be
put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence” (Veblen [ 1899 ]
1979 , 36 ). The most readily available evidence, both for individuals and
for states, is provided through acts of consumption.
Toward a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
Consumption: Handicaps and Tastes
We do not often think of political choices in terms of consumption. Yet un-
der scarcity, a decision to enact a policy, deploy an army, procure a weapon
system, or dispatch an emissary carries tangible opportunity costs. The re-
sources and political capital used in each of these decisions are consumed
and cannot be used to “purchase” other policies. In almost all cases, states
face multiple policy substitutes, several ways to spend their resources.^29 By
selecting a set of policies, states establish a particular consumption pat-
tern. The decision to “consume” a certain policy is likely to be the result
of a myriad of motivations. Normally, however, we would expect the policy
choices of states to respond to the basic dynamics of supply and demand in
the same way that consumers’ choices do.
The economic theory of demand, in its most classic form, predicts an
inverse relationship between price and individuals’ willingness to pur-
chase commodities, other things being equal. As prices fall consumers
will buy more goods and vice versa. This is a common implicit assump-
tion in political science as well. When faced with two policies offering a
similar utility, we expect a rational decision maker to opt for the cheaper
one. This assumption is so deeply engrained that it is maintained even in
analyses that are not strictly formalized as rationalist. However, actors
