The Price of Prestige

74 chapter three

unable to supply enough Harriers to protect the fleet and the ground

forces at the same time. The British carrier force was therefore stretched to

its full capacity facing a relatively minor opponent. While the Falklands War

provides a good example of the significance of carriers, it also highlights

their vulnerability to submarine attacks. The loss of any carrier would have

doomed the British operation. Argentina understood the potential effect

of such a loss and deployed its limited submarine capabilities accordingly.

Argentina had a fleet of two submarines, only one of which, the San Luis,

was operational at the time. Moreover, the San Luis was poorly equipped

and had an inadequately trained crew. Yet this lone submarine caused the

British navy a lot of trouble and required the commitment of significant

resources to antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The San Luis penetrated the

British ASW net three times to reach firing position. All three attacks failed

because of a combination of equipment failure and poor leadership. Over

two hundred ASW weapons were fired by the British over twenty- eight

days, all failing to hit the Argentine vessel (Wallace and Meconis 1995 ,

83 – 84 ). The travails of the San Luis offer a good demonstration of the po-

tency of the less prestigious submarine.

Following the Falklands War, the British government declined to en-

large or improve its small carrier fleet. The debate regarding the future of

the British carrier fleet reheated in the second part of the nineties as the

British government was called to select Britain’s future carrier. The future

carrier debate led to a lengthy public process of assessment that culminated

in a procurement order for at least two carriers of the new Queen Elizabeth

class (Isnard 2002 ; Hore and Hirschfeld 1999 ). The next generation of Brit-

ish carriers will rely on conventional landing and takeoff. This new design,

significantly larger than any other non- American carrier, will bring Britain

closer to being able to deploy forces alongside American carriers in future

conflicts. The immense cost of this buildup, however, is already dictating

cuts in other procurement programs and is raising concerns among senior

army and naval commanders. Critics question whether future conflicts are

likely to require the services of large carriers. A fleet of small carriers, ac-

cording to this critique, was appropriate for supporting British efforts in

the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, which are probably indicative of the most

likely type of conflicts Britain is expected to face in the future (Rogers

2007 ). Moreover, it is not clear whether the navy will be able to provide

the required escorts and defenses for the carrier in times of war (Black

2005 , 360 ).^20 The many delays in development and procurement created a

gap between the decommissioning of Britain’s aging STVOL fleet and the