the aircraft carrier club 77
(Bedi 2003 ; Pant 2009 ; Ladwig 2010 ).^21 India recently launched its first
homebuilt carrier, the Vikrant, which will not be fully operational before
2017 (Pant and Joshi 2015 ; Kaplan 2010 ). With the Vikrant, India became
the first Asian power to build and launch an aircraft carrier. A second in-
digenous carrier, the Vishal, is on order as well. It is expected to be signifi-
cantly larger, and there are rumors that it will rely on nuclear propulsion
and an ambitious CATOBAR design (Pandit 2015 ). The ultimate Indian
dream is to maintain a force of five carriers so that at least three ships are
available for deployment at any given time; a more realistic goal focuses
on two to three carrier groups (Scott 2013 ; Tellis 1990 ).^22 The carrier pro-
gram is part of a massive Indian naval buildup that includes forty new ships
at an estimated cost of US$ 32. 3 billion (Bana 2015 ).
While these ambitious and expensive programs are under way, about
half of the navy’s inventory is not operational and in dire need of repair.
The air wing of the carriers uses aging fighters, and currently there are
not even enough of those to supply the existing ships. The Indian navy
does not provide the required vessels for the battle groups that are sup-
posed to escort and protect the carrier and is lacking sufficient investment
in command and control and communications (Kainikara 2000 ). Under
the current budgetary limitations, there is a real risk that ambitious key
projects such as the carrier construction can become “silver bullets in a
fleet of diminished performance, diluting its effect and jeopardizing, with
the high share of resources absorbed, the overall readiness of the Indian
Navy” (De Lionis 1998 , 34 ).
Moreover, even when completed and fully operational, the strategic
value of the carriers is highly questionable. The Viraat, which was refit-
ted at great expense in order to prolong its life, is capable of launching
only eight antiquated Sea Harriers. Such a vessel ties down more resources
than is justified by the utility it may provide. It does not have enough air-
craft to carry out an attack and protect itself at the same time. Even a more
advanced carrier, such as the Gorshkov, would have a questionable role
in almost any future naval confrontation. It is estimated that the refitted
Gorshkov and the newly designed Vikrant will carry sixteen aircraft. This
comes at a cost of at least 11 percent of the navy’s budget for the fore-
seeable future (Ladwig 2010 ). All of India’s potential rivals have strong
enough air forces to deem any littoral use of these carriers unfeasible. In
case of war, the Indian carriers will have to stay offshore to attack escaping
enemy ships. Yet this role can be easily filled by cheaper surface vessels, a
weapons category in which India already enjoys a clear advantage over its
