The Price of Prestige

78 chapter three

regional rivals (Tellis 1990 ). In cases of humanitarian crisis, fixed- wing car-

riers are not a necessity. When India conducted a complex airlift operation

to rescue more than five thousand citizens and foreign nationals who were

trapped in war- torn Yemen in 2015 , it did so successfully without deploying

its aircraft carriers (Bana 2015 ).

Given this state of affairs, the Indian investment in its carriers and the

attention this investment receives are disproportional to the potential

utility of these vessels. Captain Arun Prakash of the Indian navy notes

that although India has had a million- strong army and a thousand- aircraft

air force for quite a while, it is the expansion of the navy, and especially

the carrier fleet, that has raised most concerns abroad: “Many in the West

are perplexed by India’s growing maritime power and are overcome by a

sense of the preposterous that a third world country should begin to as-

sume what has traditionally been the ‘white man’s burden’ ” (Prakash 1990 ,

58 ). For Prakash, India’s acquisition of a small carrier is an indication of

a change in the international hierarchy, and the overblown reaction is not

an indication of strategic fears but of status anxiety. Prakash goes on to

argue that India needs to build a stronger navy that would match its power

and status. Indeed, in the past few decades, Indian naval ambitions “have

grown from simply countering the Pakistani navy to becoming capable

of unrestrained blue- water operations and power- projection” (De Lionis

1998 , 32 ). Throughout this naval expansion a disproportionate amount of

attention was given to the Indian carrier program while more substantial

acquisitions, such as the acquisition of eight Kilo- class Russian subma-

rines in the late eighties or the current development of indigenously de-

signed nuclear submarines, have received relatively little international notice

(Tellis 1990 ; see also Dowdy 1990 ).^23

Italy and Spain

Both Italy and Spain have experienced historical periods of maritime su-

premacy. At present, however, both countries employ medium- sized navies

with very limited carrier capabilities. The Italian carriers are small — Cavour,

Italy’s newest carrier, which is significantly larger than its predecessor, is a

27 , 100 - ton ship, whereas Principe de Asturias, Spain’s recently decommis-

sioned carrier, is just under 18 , 000 tons (compared with a displacement

of approximately 100 , 000 tons for most American carriers). The Cavour,

which is heralded as a significant boost to Italy’s international profile, op-

erates eight Harriers (Bonsignore 2004 ). The carrier’s first mission was

Operation White Crane, which delivered Italian humanitarian assistance to