the aircraft carrier club 79
earthquake-ravaged Haiti in 2010 (Kingston 2010 ). It is debatable whether
a carrier arriving several weeks after a natural disaster is the best method of
delivering humanitarian aid or whether this type of operation justifies the
cost of this platform.
The Spanish navy opted for a cheaper model based on an American
prototype for a large patrol ship. The Spanish carriers, Principe de Astu-
rias and Juan Carlos, can hold up to thirty- seven Harriers but usually carry
up to twenty planes (“ ‘Grupo Alfa’: The Spanish Navy’s Main Fighting
Force” 1991 ). In order to minimize cost and space, the Spanish eliminated
most detection and command-and-control electronic equipment from
these ships. The Spanish carriers lack sophisticated sonar capabilities and
rely on only one propeller, affecting maneuverability and speed. The result
is an extremely vulnerable ship, practically defenseless and dependent on
its escort for protection. However, the Principe de Asturias was relatively
cheap, and as such, this model became an attractive choice for the Thai
navy (Slade 1994 ; Gause 1999 ). A similar design was also adopted by Aus-
tralia for its new helicopter carriers.
Because most major naval battles and operations take place in litto-
ral waters, carriers are likely to face land- based air forces (Keegan 1993 ,
66 – 68 ). With the expansion of air forces around the world, there are not
too many cases in which ten or even twenty planes would be a decisive
force (Luttwak 1974 , 51 ). The limitations of these carriers were clearly
demonstrated in the course of their last major deployment, during Op-
eration Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Although Italy and Spain are
among the very few countries that can send a carrier force to a conflict
zone, their contribution to the Afghanistan campaign received harsh as-
sessments: “Italy and Spain were both late and largely irrelevant in send-
ing small forces to Afghanistan” (Radu 2002 ). The Italian and Spanish
carriers were unable to provide fast response and were not able to pro-
vide a significant one. The number of possible scenarios in which the actual
military effect of this type of carrier can match its symbolic value is, con-
sequently, very small.
Russia
For many years the Soviet Union opted to stay out of a carrier arms race.
Carriers were described as instruments of imperialism and criticized for
their offensive nature, high procurement and maintenance costs, vulner-
ability, and questionable utility. Soviet experts argued that new cruise-
missile technology as well as improved submarine-warfare capabilities
